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Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and 
Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark 
and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons 
Steven M. Cordero* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself in Houston—at home or on a trip—with noth-
ing to do on a Saturday night.  So you jump into the car to seek ex-
citement in a world permeated with cultural symbolism, and you 
find that symbolism dominated this night by Cocaine-Cola, the 
Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie. 
You first encounter an assortment of posters, plastered on the 
wall next to your parking space, containing the phrase “Enjoy Co-
caine” printed in classic Coca-Cola styling.1  On the car radio, a 
painfully annoying helium voiced soprano sings, “I’m a Barbie 
Girl . . . life in plastic . . . it’s fantastic . . . you can brush my 
hair . . . undress me everywhere . . . I’m a blonde bimbo girl . . . in 
a fantasy world . . . .”2  Afterward, a commercial advertises the 
“Third Anniversary Blue Hawaiian Luau,” held by Houston’s well-
known Velvet Elvis nightclub to commemorate the twentieth anni-
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law.  The author thanks 
Heath B. Zarin, Tara J. Goldsmith, Robert L. Garner and the other editors of the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their guidance and cri-
tique, and Betsy Morales for all her assistance and encouragement.  This Note is dedi-
cated to my family for their love and support, and to Sergio Hernandez, whose undying 
spirit lives eternal. 
1. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(enjoining manufacturer from producing a poster that read “Enjoy Cocaine” in Coca-
Cola’s characteristic styling). 
2. AQUA, BARBIE GIRL (MCA Records 1997); Barbie Song as Popular as the Doll, 
HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Sept. 19, 1997, at D2. 
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versary of Elvis Presley’s “disappearance.”3 
The Velvet Elvis sounds like the antidote to your Saturday 
night blues.  So you race to the admittedly tacky nightspot4 and 
discover on stage San Francisco female Elvis impersonator Elvis 
Herselvis and Mojo Nixon, the post punk-rock performance artist 
best known for the song Elvis is Everywhere.5  In the lounge area, 
a giddy couple admires a Trailer Trash Barbie doll,6 part of the 
Anti-Barbie series that includes Exorcist Barbie, Hooker Barbie, 
and Big Dyke Barbie.7 
Your night on the town in Houston demonstrates the perva-
siveness of “popular culture” and its icons in American society.8  
 
3. Rick Mitchell, Elvis’ ‘Disappearance’ to be Celebrated; Luau, Bands, Imper-
sonator to Mark Event, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1997, at 3.  Elvis Aaron Presley “disap-
peared” on April 16, 1977.  In Memory of ‘King’ Elvis, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 15, 1997, at 
3.  The “Third Anniversary Blue Hawaiian Luau,” which offered roast pig, Blue Hawai-
ian drinks, and a candlelight vigil with a moment of silence for the “King’s disappear-
ance,” was held on August 16, 1997.  Mitchell, supra, at 3. 
4. The Velvet Elvis comes complete with lava lamps, cheap ceramic sculptures, 
beaded curtains, and vinyl furniture.  See Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. 
Supp. 783, 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (describing the Velvet Elvis nightclub). 
5. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 3. 
6. Vicki Haddock, Messin’ with Barbie; Creator of Now-Famous Trailer Trash 
Version Says He’s “Got a Hobby Gone Mad”, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 1997, at C1 
[hereinafter Haddock I].  Trailer Trash Barbie comes complete with a cigarette dangling 
from her lip, a baby swinging from her hip, black roots beneath her platinum blonde hair, 
and a quote bubble that reads “My Daddy Swears I’m the Best Kisser in the County!”  
See id. 
7. Id.  The works are the creations of amateur artist Paul Hansen, and were dis-
played in art galleries and sold at “In-Jean-Ious,” an apparel store on Castro Street, a cen-
ter of the gay community in San Francisco.  Id.; see David Armstrong, The Castro; 
KQED’s Latest Look at the City’s Neighborhoods is the Best One Yet, S.F. EXAMINER, 
Mar. 12, 1997, at B1. 
8. According to one commentator, “popular culture” can be defined as: 
[T]he culture of the subordinated and disempowered and thus always bears 
within it signs of power relations, traces of the forces of domination and subor-
dination that are central to our social system and therefore to our social experi-
ence. . . .  Popular culture . . . is culture—the active process of generating and 
circulating meanings and pleasures within a social system. . . .  Popular culture 
is made by the people, not produced by the culture industry.  All the culture in-
dustries can do is produce a repertoire of texts or culture resources for the vari-
ous formations of the people to use or reject in the ongoing process of produc-
ing their popular culture. 
JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE 4-5, 23-24 (1989) [hereinafter POP 
CULTURE]. 
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Yet each of those symbols you encountered during the night was 
used without authorization, thus creating potential infringements of 
the creators’ trademark and publicity rights.  The question, how-
ever, is whether the creators alone should have the rights to profit 
from the exploitation of those symbols, or whether those rights 
should be shared by the public whose patronage gives value to cul-
tural icons.9  First Amendment principles of free expression sug-
gest that a new standard be required to allow uninhibited public 
use, absent confusion as to source, sponsorship or affiliation.10 
Because Coca-Cola, Elvis Presley, and Barbie are elements of 
American popular culture, they are part of our everyday lan-
guage.11  Coca-Cola represents not only a beverage, but also Amer-
ica itself.12  Elvis Presley was a not only celebrated musical enter-
tainer, but also the embodiment of “Rock-n-Roll” and the focus of 
a cultural obsession.13  Barbie is not only a doll, manufactured by 
 
9. See Nicholas J. Jollymore, Expiration of the Right of Publicity—When Symbolic 
Names and Images Pass Into the Public Domain, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 125, 130 (1994) 
(arguing that a celebrity losses the right to control his image when it achieves symbolic 
significance). 
10. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Trademark Rights and First Amendment Wrongs: Pro-
tecting the Former Without Committing the Latter, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 633, 634-35 
(1993) [hereinafter Langvardt I] (proposing a standard for balancing trademark rights and 
freedom of expression). 
11. See Jollymore, supra note 9. 
12. See MARK PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY AND COCA COLA: THE 
UNAUTHORIZED HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SOFT DRINK AND THE COMPANY THAT 
MAKES IT 370-71 (1993).  One commentator states that: 
The American public . . . revered a drink that symbolized America, that was as-
sociated with almost every aspect of their lives—first dates, moments of victory 
and defeat, joyous group celebrations, pensive solitude.  As a poetic Texas con-
sumer had written in his 1985 love letter to the drink, “Whenever things began 
to look too bleak, I’d come over and pick [Coca-Cola] up, we’d share a few 
minutes together, and I would be comforted.” 
Id. 
13. See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (D.N.J. 1981).  
See GRIEL MARCUS, DEAD ELVIS: A CHRONICLE OF A CULTURAL OBSESSION (1991), for a 
history detailing the creation of the Elvis myth after his death and his impact on Ameri-
can culture.  In August 1997, fifty-thousand Elvis fans from around the world gathered in 
Memphis, Tennessee to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Elvis’s death.  See 
Jim Yardley, 50, 000 Honor Elvis: King is Dead; Long Live the King, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Aug. 16, 1997, at O1.  Similar to previous celebrations, the week-long com-
memoration included an Elvis Riverboat Cruise and Dance Party, an Elvis International 
Gold and Platinum Record Award Ceremony, an Elvis Fan Club President’s Gala, a new 
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Mattel, Inc. and venerated by millions of fans, but also is a symbol 
of American sexism.14 
Coca-Cola and Barbie as objects and Elvis as a celebrity, have 
transcended their original meanings and ascended to the level of 
cultural icons.15  A cultural icon is an image, picture, or representa-
tion that is an external expression of a society’s internal convic-
tions.16  Icons objectify deep mythic structures of reality, express-
ing everyday things that make every day meaningful.17 
In our society, icons are created through a partnership of pur-
veyor18 and populace, whereby the purveyor of a commodity19 sup-
plies the product, and the consumer—through an active creative 
practice—appropriates it by investing the product with new mean-
ing.20  Cultural icons span generations, from Matures through Gen-
 
Elvis statute, candle light vigil, and an Elvis lecture and Conversation.  See id. 
14. See M.G. LORD, BARBIE: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF A REAL DOLL 89-
90 (1994).  According to one commentator: 
[The National Organization for Women]’s formal assault on Mattel began in 
August 1971, when its New York chapter issued a press release condemning 
ten companies for sexist advertising. . . .  Feminists followed up in February 
1972 by leafleting at a Toy Fair . . . [alleging] that . . . Barbie encouraged girls 
to see themselves solely as mannequins, sex objects or housekeepers. 
Id. 
15. See Jollymore, supra note 9, at 141 (offering that certain celebrities such as El-
vis, as cultural icons, “become such a locus of reference in contemporary communication 
that the mere invocation of their name or image conveys meaning”).  Mattel promoted an 
art exhibit in 1995 entitled, “Art, Design, and Barbie: The Evolution of a Cultural Icon.”  
Barbara D. Phillips, Beyond Her Ken: The Art of the Doll, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1995, at 
A12; see also FREDERICK ALLEN, SECRET FORMULA: HOW BRILLIANT MARKETING AND 
RELENTLESS SALESMANSHIP MADE COCA-COLA THE BEST-KNOWN PRODUCT IN THE 
WORLD 424-25 (1994) (discussing the global impact of Coca-Cola as an icon). 
16. See MARSHALL W. FISHWICK, SEVEN PILLARS OF POPULAR CULTURE 131 (1985) 
(defining cultural icon). 
17. See id. 
18. This Note uses the term “purveyor” to refer to the supplier of a product (either 
tangible, such as a soft drink or doll, or intangible, such as one’s persona) who may or 
may not have a title or interest in the intellectual property associated with the product. 
19. This Note uses the term “commodities” to refer to products that are either cul-
tural (movie, musical, or video performance) or industrial (tangible item).  See Michael 
Madow, Private Ownership of the Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 
81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 139 (1993) (analyzing the publicity rights and the popular culture 
debate). 
20. See id. at 140. 
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eration X.21  Each generation invests its own meaning in the icons, 
regardless of whether the icons were inherited from preceding gen-
erations or newly created.22  Consumers “recode” commodities in 
ways that better serve their particular needs and interests, and “re-
work” them to express meanings different from the ones intended 
or preferred by their producers.23  The consumers neither uni-
formly receive nor uncritically accept the “preferred meanings” 
that are generated and circulated by the purveyors.24  Commenta-
tors have argued that there is a “realm of living common culture” 
in which individuals and groups use commodities creatively to do 
“symbolic work” and thereby “establish their presence, identity, 
 
21. The term, Generation X, now widespread, was first popularized to describe the 
generation born between 1964 and 1979, in DOUGLAS COUPLAND, GENERATION X: TALES 
FOR AN ACCELERATED CULTURE (1991).  Commentators offer that Generation X, like 
other generations, was forged through common experience: 
The [generation] described as “matures,” born from 1909 to 1945, was shaped 
by the Depression and World War II.  “Boomers,” born from 1946 to 1964, 
grew up in affluence: economic progress was assumed, freeing them to focus 
on idealism and personal growth. [Generation X] grew up . . . [in] divorce, [as 
l]atchkey kids, [with h]omelessness, [s]oaring national debt, [b]ankrupt Social 
Security, [h]oles in the ozone layer, [c]rack, [d]ownsizing and layoffs, [u]rban 
deterioration, [g]angs, and [j]unk bonds . . . . 
Margot Hornblower, Great Xpectations Slackers? Hardly. The So-Called Generation X 
Turns Out to be Full of Go-Getters Who Are Just Doing It—But Their Way, TIME, June 9, 
1997, at 58. 
22. For example, Generation X invests new meaning in commodities based on its 
members’ common experiences as defined through exposure to television.  See ROBERT 
OWEN, GEN X TV: THE BRADY BUNCH TO MELROSE PLACE (1997), for a discussion of 
how the identity and culture of this generation was defined by the media saturation from 
the 1970’s until the present.  One commentator argues that: 
[Generation] Xers are all members of one TV nation.  Although not the first 
group of Americans to grow up on TV, Xers are the first group for whom TV 
served as a regularly scheduled baby-sitter.  [Generation X] was the first to ex-
perience MTV and the Fox network, and they are an audience many advertisers 
are eager to reach.  Xers are the most media-savvy generation ever. 
Id. at 5. 
23. See id. at 139.  Proponents of this view, entitled “cultural populism,” are writers 
associated with or influenced by the British “cultural studies” movement.  See, e.g., IAIN 
CHAMBERS, POPULAR CULTURE: THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE (1986) (analyzing cul-
tural populism); JOHN FISKE, READING THE POPULAR (1989) [hereinafter READING THE 
POPULAR] (same); JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE (1987) [hereinafter TV CULTURE] 
(same); ANDREW ROSS, NO RESPECT: INTELLECTUALS AND POPULAR CULTURE (1989) 
(same); PAUL WILLIS ET AL., COMMON CULTURE: SYMBOLIC WORK AT PLAY IN THE 
EVERYDAY CULTURES OF THE YOUNG (1990)(same). 
24. See Madow, supra note 19, at 139. 
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and meaning.”25 
Rights holders26 control the image or representation of com-
modities through the legal regime of trademark law and the right of 
publicity.  The word “Coca-Cola” is a trademark, as is any word, 
name, symbol, or device employed by a manufacturer or a mer-
chant to identify her goods and to distinguish them from those of 
another.27  Elvis Presley’s right of publicity is the same as the in-
herent right of every human being to control the commercial use of 
his or her identity.28  Although trademark law protects consumers 
from confusion due to false or misleading marks,29 publicity rights 
 
25. WILLIS, supra note 23, at 1-2; see also CHAMBERS, supra note 23, at 53-54 
(demonstrating how urban street “style” is achieved “through the creative bricozlage of 
ordinary commodities”). 
26. The term “rights holder,” as used in this Note, refers to any party, person, or 
corporation who has an interest or title in an object of intellectual property, such as a 
trademark or persona.  For example, Coca-Cola Company is the rights holder of the 
trademark “Coca-Cola”; Mattel Incorporated is the rights holder of the trademark “Bar-
bie”; and Elvis Presley Enterprises is the rights holders of not only the trademark “Elvis” 
but also his publicity rights.  See infra Part II (detailing briefly, the origins and efforts of 
rights holders to defend the images of Coca-Cola, Elvis Presley, and Barbie). 
27. See 15 U.S.C.A § 1127 (West Supp. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995); Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.NY. 1988).  
The Restatement elaborates in the commentary: 
The definition of “trademark” . . . does not incorporate any technical limitations 
on the nature of the subject matter that may qualify for protection.  Words re-
main the most common type of trademark . . . .  Numbers, letters, and slogans 
are also eligible for protection as trademarks, as are pictures, symbols, charac-
ters, sounds, graphic designs, product and packaging features, and other matter 
capable of identifying and distinguishing the goods or services of the user. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. g (1995). 
28. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A 
Tribute, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1987) [hereinafter McCarthy I].  Professor 
McCarthy states that: 
The modern view of the right of publicity is that it is an inherent right of iden-
tity possessed by everyone at birth. . . .  [N]oncelebrities do indeed have a right 
of publicity.  Noncelebrities should not be locked into the “mental distress” 
mold of privacy law—a constraint that forces them to limit their complaint to 
proof of hurt feelings and mental distress, buttressed by stories of sleepless 
nights and psychiatric care.  If these plaintiffs only want the fair market value 
of their dentity, then the right of publicity should be available. 
Id. at 1710. 
29. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.  
Senate Report 1333 states that the goal of federal trademark law, as set forth in the Lan-
ham Act, Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
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protect the person from the commercial appropriation of his or her 
persona.30  A separate basis for trademark protection is the anti-
dilution doctrine, whereby a trademark owner such as Mattel, Inc. 
is protected against the diminishment in value of a mark such as 
“Barbie.”31 
The First Amendment32 provides a limitation for imposing li-
ability for trademark infringement, anti-dilution, and appropriation 
of publicity rights for some forms of expression.33  Although the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the freedom of expression 
has relevance under trademark law,34 the Court’s most significant 
contribution to resolving the issue of constitutional ramifications in 
private actions, was the defamation case New York Times v. Sulli-
van.35  In Sullivan, the Court recognized that when a private liti-
 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)), is “to protect the 
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark 
which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.”  S. 
REP. NO. 79-1333, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44-49 (1995); infra Part I.C (discussing the right of 
publicity). 
30. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 28:1 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS].  Professor 
McCarthy argues that the right of publicity is “infringed by the unpermitted use which 
will likely damage the commercial value of this inherent right of human identity and 
which is not immunized by principles of free speech and free press.”  Id. 
31. See id. § 24:95.  Professor McCarthy states that: 
Dilution by tarnishment, along with “blurring,” comprises the two classic 
prongs of dilution. . . .  After tarnishment, a famous mark still uniquely identi-
fies a certain source, but the mark no longer uniquely identifies a certain degree 
or quality and favorable reputation.  The positive associations the mark identi-
fies are corroded and diluted by the tarnishing use. 
Id. 
32. The First Amendment reads, in pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
33. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 28:40; Langvardt I, supra 
note 10 (proposing a standard for balancing trademark rights and freedom of expression); 
Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Infringement Litigation 1997: Sense & Sensibility, 559 
PLI/LIT. 361, 399 (1997). 
34. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 
483 U.S. 522, 527 (1987) (stating that the United States Olympic Committee’s property 
right in the word “Olympic” and associated symbols and slogans may be protected with-
out violating the First Amendment); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (holding 
that the regulation of trade names is to be judged under the standards governing commer-
cial speech ). 
35. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).  One commentator asserts that: 
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gant invokes the courts to enforce rules of law, there is sufficient 
government action to elicit First Amendment scrutiny.36  Those 
constitutional principles prevent rights holders from attempting to 
stifle speech under the guise of intellectual property rights.37 
Rights holders have attempted to use the more expansive doc-
trines of anti-dilution and the right of publicity to inhibit the pub-
lic, through artists and advertisers, from utilizing cultural icons.38  
The use of Coca-Cola, Elvis, and Barbie by artists, such as Andy 
Warhol, has been protected against the ownership interests of 
rights holders under First Amendment principles regarding artistic 
expressions, implicit in the fair use exception to trademark law and 
the parody defense.39  Others, using such images in a commercial 
 
[S]tate recognition and enforcement of private rights touching forms of com-
munication is itself sufficient to subject the resulting exercises of private power 
to constitutional scrutiny . . . .  Perhaps the most familiar example is the line of 
United States Supreme Court decisions commencing with New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan. . . .  In that case . . . [d]espite the fact that the role of the state was 
limited to the enforcement of private rights, the Court showed no hesitation in 
subjecting the entire regime to constitutional inspection. . . .  New York 
Times . . . concerned the limitations imposed by the First Amendment upon 
state doctrines restricting forms of expression that might intrude upon personal 
rights.  Similar constitutional limitations operate with respect to state-ordained 
property rights. 
Robert C. Denicola, Trademark as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging 
Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 207 (1982). 
36. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.  The Supreme Court reasoned that: 
[T]he Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim 
to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and 
press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is 
common law only. . . .  The test is not the form in which state power has been 
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power in fact has been exercised. 
Id. 
37. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 
F. 2d 490, 496 (2d Cir.  1989) (holding that the First Amendment interest in free expres-
sion outweighed the slight risk of consumer confusion under trademark law); L.L. Bean, 
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F. 2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the applica-
tion of Maine’s anti-dilution statute to magazine’s non-commercial parody of plaintiff’s 
trademark violated the First Amendment ); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (holding that the use of plaintiff’s name in a movie title was protected under 
the First Amendment). 
38. See Madow, supra note 19, at 142 (analyzing the publicity rights and the popu-
lar culture debate); Jollymore, supra note 9, at 130-35 (arguing that a celebrity loses the 
right to control his or her image when it achieves symbolic significance). 
39. See George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Art-
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context or in a gaudy manner, have not been afforded protection.40  
These unequal outcomes have resulted from courts’ failures to rec-
ognize the First Amendment implications, misunderstanding of the 
cultural significance of icons, failures to acknowledge the con-
sumer-public’s substantial role in the ascendancy of the image, and 
reliance on a commercial/non-commercial speech distinction that 
one pioneering commentator labeled “irrational” and fundamen-
tally flawed.41 
This Note argues that in order to facilitate First Amendment 
principles of freedom of expression, a new standard should apply 
to cases dealing with the unauthorized use of cultural icons, per-
mitting uninhibited use so long as there is no confusion as to 
source, sponsorship, or affiliation.  Part I reviews trademark law, 
publicity rights, and First Amendment implications.  Part II pre-
sents the history and efforts of rights holders who have attempted 
to protect the images of Coca-Cola, Elvis, and Barbie.  Part III 
maintains that a likelihood of confusion standard is appropriate as 
a result of balancing the interests of rights-holders and the public.  
This Note concludes that courts should use the proposed new stan-
 
ist—Part I., R.I. B.J., Mar. 1996, at 7.  According to some commentators: 
An artist’s freedom to use the icons against such legal protections [as trade-
mark, copyright, and the rights of privacy and publicity] ties into First Amend-
ment concerns. . . .  Andy Warhol’s Cambell Soup Cans, “Double Elvis,” and 
John Wayne portraits make powerful statements about art and our consumer-
ist/fame based society.  Other artists incorporate similar icons from culture-
corporate logos, famous faces, and golden political calves. 
Id.; see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the limitations of the fair use and parody de-
fense to trademark infringement). 
40. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200, 205 
(2d Cir.1979) (reasoning that it would be difficult for those who viewed defendant’s 
“sexually depraved” film to disassociate it thereafter with the Dallas Cowboy Cheerlead-
ers); Mutual of Omaha Ins. v. Novak, 775 F.2d 247, 250 (finding against the maker of 
“Mutant of Omaha” merchandise protesting the arms race). 
41. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial 
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 565 
(1997); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment 
Analysis, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 177, 204-206 (1987).  One commentator argues that 
“commercial speech serves the values of free speech protection as much or more than 
does any category of fully protected expression. . . .  Today, careful examination reveals 
that without question, none of the remaining arguments relied upon to justify commercial 
speech’s second class status justifies the distinction’s continued existence.”  Redish, su-
pra, at 565. 
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dard to achieve equitable results when resolving conflicts over the 
unauthorized uses of images or representations of cultural icons. 
I. TRADEMARKS, PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The use of identifying marks on goods dates to antiquity, with 
the original purpose being to indicate ownership.42  In the United 
States, marks distinguishing merchandise have a long history of 
protection under the common law and state statutes.43  Yet federal 
trademark law has only met success in the twentieth century.44  In 
contrast, the right of publicity, despite allusion to in earlier cases,45 
was not recognized for the first time until 1953.46 
 
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. b.  According to 
the American Law Institute, the use of trademarks date to ancient times: 
The use of trademarks was well known in Roman times, although it was appar-
ently left to the defrauded purchaser to bring an action against a trademark in-
fringer.  The guild system of medieval England produced the first widespread 
use of trademarks.  Distinctive production marks were required on goods manu-
factured by the local guilds.  Manufacturers began to adopt marks expressly for 
the purpose of identifying their goods to prospective customers.  The medieval 
production mark thus evolved into the modern trademark used by manufactur-
ers, distributors, and other sellers to identify their goods and services in the 
marketplace. 
Id. 
43. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and use a 
symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person whose 
mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has long been recognized by the 
common law . . . .”); Walton v. Crowley, 29 F. Cas. 138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 
17,133) (preventing the sale of sowing needles packaged under counterfeit replicas of a 
competitor’s labels); Coffen v. Brunton, 5 F. Cas. 1184 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 2,946) 
(holding that the law prevents the adoption of another’s mark or label when it prevents 
the public from distinguishing between competitors’ products); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. 
Cas. 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785) (preventing the sale of thread bearing coun-
terfeit replicas of a competitor’s trademarks). 
44. See Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retro-
spective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 59, 63 (1996) 
(detailing the pre-history of the Lanham Act). 
45. See, e.g., Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358, 361 (D. Mass. 1934) (ruling that 
the commercial value of a celebrity’s name for advertising purposes can create rights of a 
pecuniary nature), modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936); 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (enforcing an agency 
agreement for the marketing of a celebrity’s endorsements). 
46. See Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); see also Madow, supra note 19, 147-48 (arguing that 
the right of publicity is not a new right for a new wrong because the commercial exploita-
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A. Trademark Doctrine 
Intellectual property law offers authors and inventors protec-
tion for their intellectual creations.47  Intellectual property law’s 
principle objective is to grant those originators of information a 
limited monopoly in the form of patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks.48  These legal instruments are similar in that they safeguard 
innovation, but differ in their purpose for protection.49  For exam-
ple, although patent and copyright protection is afforded to encour-
age and reward creative expression and innovation, trademark pro-
tection’s goal is to protect owners and the public from unfair 
competition and prevent consumer confusion.50  This qualified pro-
tection of trademarks is viewed as “a general attempt to implement 
standards of commercial morality and fair dealing in the market.”51 
Traditionally, the law has afforded a trademark owner only a 
 
tion of celebrities has existed since the eighteenth century). 
47. See Intellectual Property—Patent and Trade Dress Law—Tenth Circuit Applies 
“Significant Inventive Aspect” Test to Determine Whether Utility Patent Precludes Trade 
Dress Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (1996); David Friedman, Standards as 
Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1994); 
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 291 (1988); 
see also Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What’s Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act 
Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 821, 826 
(1997). 
48. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974-76 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the role of monopolies in both patent and copyright law); see also Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (“[Copyright, unlike a patent], gives no exclusive rights to the 
art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not to the idea it-
self.”); American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980) (“Trademark rights, unlike statutory copyright or pat-
ents, are not rights in gross or at large.”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 6:7 (stating that 
patent law deals with the concept of functional and design inventions, and grants mo-
nopolies in order to encourage investment in new technology and invention). 
49. See Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 827. 
50. See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 53 
(2d ed. 1996) (summarizing the distinction between trademarks, copyrights, and patents); 
see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“[A trade-
mark] is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will in 
trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol—-a commercial signature-—upon the 
merchandise or the package in which it is sold.”); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 
240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). 
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c; see also Goldsmith, 
supra note 47, at 827. 
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limited right to prevent another’s appropriation of his or her prop-
erty.52  Early trademark law focused on preventing deception in the 
market place.53  Its origin can be traced to the common law action 
for deceit, whereby a member of the public would claim that she 
was deceived into buying a merchant’s product through the latter’s 
misleading adoption of a competitor’s trademark.54  The trademark 
owner itself was powerless to prevent unauthorized use of the 
mark.55  Eventually, courts of equity began to allow the trademark 
owner to obtain injunctive relief against a competitor’s use of the 
mark.56 
Early in this century, a trademark owner’s right to prevent an-
other’s use of the mark extended only to situations in which con-
sumers were led to believe that the owner’s product originated with 
the trademark owner.57  Courts eventually disregarded the re-
quirement of actual confusion58 in favor of a likelihood of confu-
sion model.59  In the last twenty years, the doctrine has expanded 
still further, to forbid unauthorized uses that elicit a public percep-
 
52. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 US 82, 92-94 (1879); see also Denicola, supra 
note 35, at 159 (noting the increased tendency of courts to treat trademarks as property); 
Shaughnessy, supra note 41, at 180 (discussing the confusion doctrine of trademark pro-
tection). 
53. See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical His-
tory of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 310-26 (1979) (detailing the historical 
developments of the idea that trademarks are intangible property). 
54. See id. at 311. 
55. See id. 
56. See id. at 313. 
57. See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (“A 
trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s 
good will against the sale of another’s product as his.”); see also Shaughnessy, supra note 
41, at 180 (detailing the history of trademark protection). 
58. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.M., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 
973, 980 (10th Cir. 1932) (holding that a senior corporation is protected against the use of 
a confusingly similar name by junior user, though businesses are dissimilar, where confu-
sion as to identity is likely to injure business reputation). 
59. See 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 23:1 (discussing the likeli-
hood of confusion model).  In determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, 
courts generally consider the factors enunciated in the influential case, Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polaroid Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), that is, (1) the strength of 
the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the relatedness of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s services; (3) the 
similarity of the marks; (4) the usages; (5) the marketing channels used; (6) the evidence 
of actual confusion; (7) the defendant’s good faith; (8) the likelihood of expansion of the 
product line using the mark; and (9) the sophistication of relevant buyers.  Id. 
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tion of the trademark owner’s approval or sponsorship.60  Despite 
those developments, consumer confusion remains the basis for le-
gal protection afforded to trademark owners.61 
Modern economic analysis emphasizes additional interests un-
derlying the protection of trademarks.62  The public-benefits af-
forded by competitive markets cannot be fully realized unless pro-
spective consumers can differentiate the products of competing 
sellers.63  In the absence of effective trademark protection, individ-
ual sellers gain little from improvements in product quality or ser-
vice because they cannot benefit from a favorable consumer re-
sponse.64  The protection of trademarks, thus, encourages 
investment in quality and service by securing to the trademark 
owner the benefits of a favorable reputation.65 
The economic analysis that has been invoked to support a vig-
orous system of trademark protection, as well as trademark law it-
self, has not gone unquestioned.  Some argue that strong trade-
marks act as barriers to market-entry for new competitors and also 
enable trademark owners to escape the full rigors of competition 
through product differentiation and irrational brand loyalty sus-
tained by advertising.66  There is also a growing concern that 
trademark law is being expanded beyond the boundaries of its in-
 
60. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 
F2d 368, 386-90,  (5th Cir. 1977).  This expansion reflects the relatively recent rise of 
trademark licensing, which allows a trademark owner to authorize another party to use 
the mark.  See generally 2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, §§ 18.13-18.22 
(discussing trademark licensing and franchising agreements). 
61. See Shaughnessy, supra note 41, at 181(examining consumer confusion and 
trademark infringement). 
62. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987).  According to Landes and Posner: 
The benefit of the brand name is analogous to that of designating individuals by 
last as well as first names, so that, instead of having to say ‘the Geoffrey who 
teaches constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School—not the 
one who teaches corporations,’ you can say ‘Geoffrey Stone, not Geoffrey 
Miller.’. . .  The value of a trademark is the saving in [consumer] search costs 
made possible by the information or reputation that the trademark conveys . . . . 
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c. 
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
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tended purpose.67 
B. The Lanham Act 
Trademarks do not enjoy the same constitutional foundation68 
as patents and copyrights.69  The Supreme Court has expressly held 
that the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not 
encompass trademark protection.70  Trademark protection, on the 
other hand, is grounded in the common law.71  Following this 
common law underpinning, and basing its legislation on the Com-
merce Clause,72 Congress enacted trademark statutes in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century that ultimately proved un-
successful.73  Finally, after years of delay, Congress passed the 
 
67. See Goldsmith, supra 47, at 827 (discussing the extension trademark protec-
tion); see also Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 252 F.2d 945, 955 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(“Under modern conditions, with vastly increased means of communication and the use 
of advertising media of a far-reaching character, many recent cases have afforded the 
holder of a trademark protection.”); Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 
1948); Ambassador East v. Shelton Corners, 120 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
68. See Kenneth L. Port, Foreword to Symposium on Intellectual Property Law 
Theory, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 594 (1993); Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 61 
(explaining that the Supreme Court, in The Trade-Mark Cases, struck down Congress’s 
first incursion into federal trademark law, due to the lack of an express Constitutional 
power). 
69. See U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“[C]ongress shall have Power . . . To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
70. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 86 (1879) (finding the Act of July 8 uncon-
stitutional because Congress based its authority to regulate trademarks on the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, but noting that Congress could have constitutionally based its authority 
on the Commerce Clause).  The Supreme Court’s justification was based on the rationale 
that trademark protection does not “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any 
work of the brain.”  Id.  Such protection is based “simply . . . on priority of appropria-
tion.”  Id.; Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 829 (discussing the origins of the Lanham Act). 
71. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 86. 
72. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes.”).  See generally Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability?  The Intersec-
tion of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a 
Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1995) 
(maintaining that the Constitution prevents Congress from providing authors or inventors 
exclusive rights unbounded by time limitations). 
73. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 61-62 (examining the history of trade-
mark law).  The first statute to follow The Trade-Mark Cases was an 1881 act that lim-
ited federal trademark registration to marks used in commerce with foreign nations or the 
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Lanham Act on July 5, 1946, repealing the prior statutes.74 
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name 
symbol, or device or any other combination thereof adopted and 
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and dis-
tinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.”75  The 
Lanham Act is founded on the principal that it is not equitable for a 
party to use a unique symbol and to trade on another party’s good-
will and reputation to promote his or her own goods or services, 
when the other party has expended resources to develop an identi-
fication for his or her product.76 
 
Indian tribes.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (repealed 1946).  That stat-
ute was followed by another trademark law in 1905 and a particularly broader statute in 
1920.  See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946); Act of Mar. 19, 
1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533 (repealed 1946). 
74. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 63; see also discussion supra note 29 and 
accompanying text (referring to the legislative history of the Lanham Act). 
75. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998); see also Towers v. Advent 
Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look Inc., 693 F. 
Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  Exclusive rights to a particular symbol or word 
adopted as a trademark belong to the entity that first uses the mark to identify and distin-
guish its product from the products of others.  See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, §§ 5.3-
5.4 (discussing the origins of the Lanham Act). 
76. See, e.g., Frisch’s Restaurant v. Shoney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 
1985) (“Congress enacted the Lanham Act to make ‘actionable the deceptive and mis-
leading use of marks in . . . commerce . . . [and] to protect persons engaged in such com-
merce against unfair competition.’”); Federal-Mogul Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 
F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1963) (“[T]he primary purpose of the [Lanham] Act was to elimi-
nate deceitful practices in interstate commerce involving the misuse of trademarks, . . . 
[and] to eliminate other forms of misrepresentations which are of the same general char-
acter even though they do not involve any use of what can technically be called a [trade-
mark].”); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(stating that the “public interest” behind trademark protection and unfair competition law 
is the “preservation of honesty and fair dealing in business”); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-413 (1916) (“The redress that is accorded in trademark cases 
is based upon the party’s right to be protected in the good will of a trade or business.”); 
see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78,84 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Dresser Indus. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1968); 
Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 829 (examining the rationale behind the Lanham Act). 
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1. Trademark Infringement 
The Lanham Act’s expansive reach is due in part to the grow-
ing prominence of section 43(a) (“section 43(a)”).77  Initially, sec-
tion 43(a) was interpreted as forbidding only “passing-off,”78 or the 
infringement or unauthorized use of a trademark.79  Expansive ju-
dicial interpretation and Congressional amendments have enlarged 
section 43(a) into an instrument for prohibiting infringement of 
common law marks,80 trade dress infringement,81 false advertis-
ing,82 
 
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1).  Section 43(a) states, in relevant part: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services or 
commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another per-
son’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil ac-
tion by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by 
such act. 
Id.; see also Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 59 (quoting section 43(a) as enacted). 
78. The early common law of trademark prevented only “passing off,” that is, palm-
ing off one producer’s goods as those of another.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d.  The term “passing off” is now used more broadly to describe 
any situation in which the conduct of a seller creates a likelihood that prospective pur-
chasers will be confused as to the source of the goods or services.  See id. at § 4, cmt. b. 
79. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 64 (examining the early years of section 
43(a)). 
80. See Idling v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (holding that 
“infringement of a common law service mark is cognizable under [section] 43(a) . . . 
where the mark or goods are in some way caused to enter into interstate commerce”). 
81. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 769, 774 (1992) (find-
ing that inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable under section 43(a) without proof 
of secondary meaning); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co., 197 
F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (granting injunctive relief under section 43(a) against the 
defendant’s use of packaging which constituted an unfair use of plaintiff’s trade dress). 
82. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1109 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[S]imple 
claims of false representations in advertising are actionable under section 43(a) when 
brought by competitors of the wrongdoer, even though they do not involve misuse of a 
trademark.”). 
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and other practices falling within the realm of “unfair competi-
tion.”83 
Section 43(a) protects both registered84 and unregistered trade-
marks,85 where the use may constitute a false designation of origin, 
sponsorship, or approval.86  Courts have applied section 43(a) to 
protect a variety of unregistered or common law marks or trade 
names,87 abandoned marks that are reused,88 and marks that have 
been denied registration.89  Congress codified the judicial interpre-
tations of section 43(a) with respect to false designation of origin, 
in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.90 
Section 43(a) not only prohibits trademark infringement, but 
also provides protection against the use of any false designations of 
origin or false descriptions.91  It is generally accepted that, under 
 
83. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 64 (discussing the role of section 43(a) in 
enforcing rights encompassed within the term “unfair competition”). 
84. See, e.g., Guess? v. Mai-Tai Boutique, 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (protecting the plaintiff’s registered trademarks). 
85. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768; see also Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas 
Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Under [section 43(a)], 
the registration of a mark is not a prerequisite of recovery . . . .”). 
86. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998); see also Meier Co. v. 
Albany Novelty Mfg., Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that unregistered or 
common law trademarks fall within the scope of section 43(a)). 
87. See, e.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (granting section 43(a) protection to “Jollitop” women’s blouses 
because that brand name had become widely known as the plaintiff’s exclusive trade-
mark). 
88. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, 
Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1131-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that reuse does not cure 
abandonment of a trademark, but instead generates new, albeit limited, trademark rights 
from the date of reuse), vacated pursuant to settlement, 859 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), 
cited in L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 
1996); Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.), Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(stating that the first bona fide user of an abandoned mark acquires trademark rights in 
the areas in which he uses the mark). 
89. See, e.g., Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039 (4th 
Cir. 1984) (allowing a plastics manufacturer to claim trademark protection for its banana 
split and ice cream sundae dishes, even though trademark registration had been denied). 
90. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (ef-
fective Nov. 16, 1989); see also Horwitz & Levi, supra note 44, at 69 (detailing Congres-
sional codification of the Trademark Revision Act of 1988). 
91. Section 43(a) prohibits “false or misleading description of fact, or false or mis-
leading representation of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrep-
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section 43(a), false or misleading descriptions or representations of 
fact cover statements that are literally false, as well as statements 
that, although literally true, create false impressions.92 
2. Trademark Dilution 
Dilution, in contrast to trademark infringement, is the dimin-
ishment over time of the capacity of a distinctive trademark to 
identify the source of goods bearing that mark.93  Dilution may oc-
cur even in the absence of consumer confusion, with damage mani-
festing itself in the harm to the mark.94  A weakening or reduction 
in the ability of a mark to effectively distinguish one source can 
arise either by “blurring” or “tarnishment.”95  Blurring occurs 
when a distinctive mark is associated with a plethora of different 
goods and services, diminishing the uniqueness and distinctiveness 
of the mark.96  Tarnishment occurs when the effect of the unau-
 
resents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
92. Id.; see also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 930 F. Supp. 753, 779 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that section 43(a) covers either advertisements that are literally 
false, or though literally true, are likely to mislead and confuse); Mutation Mink Breeders 
Ass’n v. LOU Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 162 (1959) (stating that the likelihood of 
public deception is an issue of fact to be resolved by considering all relevant circum-
stances). 
93. See 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 24:70 (analyzing trademark 
dilution); Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Like-
lihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 121, 123 (1996) (de-
tailing the pre-history of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act). 
94. See Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (“Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection which if al-
lowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”); Allied 
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 543, 198 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 418, 422 (1977) (distinguishing dilution as “[n]ot public confusion caused by 
similar products or services sold by competitors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar 
products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinc-
tive trade-mark or name”). 
95. 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 24:67 (discussing blurring and 
tarnishment under trademark dilution). 
96. See id. at §24:68; see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 
Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (blurring involved the “whittling away of an 
established trademark’s selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others 
upon dissimilar products”).  The Second Circuit has articulated six factors in considering 
the likelihood of dilution caused by blurring “(1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of 
the products covered by the marks; (3) sophistication of consumers; (4) predatory intent; 
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thorized use is to tarnish or degrade positive associations of the 
mark, thereby diluting its distinctive quality.97 
Dilution was not actionable under federal law prior to the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“Dilution Act”).98  Dilution 
was actionable, however, under state law in approximately half of 
the states.99  Under state statutes, a plaintiff can establish dilution 
by demonstrating that its trademark is distinctive and that the de-
fendant’s mark was likely to dilute the plaintiff’s mark.100  The Di-
lution Act, on the other hand, applies protection only to “famous” 
marks.101  The rationale for granting protection only to “famous” 
 
(5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of the junior mark.”  Mead Data, 875 F.2d 
at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring). 
97. See Hormel Foods Corp v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“The sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff’s mark will suffer negative 
associations through defendant’s use); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 24:95 (analyzing 
tarnishment). 
98. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(c), 
1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)). 
99. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1984); ARK. CODE ANN. § 70-550 (Michie 1987); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(c) 
(West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1986); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977); 765 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 1036/65 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.111(2) (West 1986); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51-223.1 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 
1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1986); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
417.061(1) (West 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-
122 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Mi-
chie 1978); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 
(1983); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1985); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1984). 
100. See Prager, supra note 93, at 123 (detailing the pre-history of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act); see, e.g., Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1029-30 (holding that, under 
New York law, the automobile manufacturer’s use of the mark “Lexus” for its new lux-
ury automobile, did not dilute the defendant’s mark “Lexis” used to symbolize computer-
ized legal research services, because the marks were not substantially similar, the prod-
ucts did not compete with each other, and the “Lexis” mark was not strong outside of the 
defendant’s market). 
101. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c).  The Dilution Act adds a new definition to 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1127 for “dilution” as the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition 
between the owner of a famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, 
mistake, or deception.  It also adds new subsection (c) to section 43 of the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125, to create a federal cause of action “to protect famous marks from 
unauthorized uses that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and established renown of such 
marks and, thereby, dilute their distinctive quality.”  Id.; see, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enter. v. 
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marks is that those marks are most likely to be adversely affected 
by dilution.102  The Dilution Act provides courts with a non-
exclusive list of factors to consider when determining whether a 
mark is “famous.”103 
C. The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity protects the individual, primarily a celeb-
rity,104 against the commercial misappropriation of his or her name 
or likeness without consent.105  Generally, the principle interest 
 
Penguin Books U.S.A., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (asserting a cause of action under 
the Dilution Act); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same); 
WAWA Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (same); Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same). 
102. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 24:95 (discussing famous marks under dilution 
law). 
103. 15 U.S.C.A. 1125(c)(1).  The eight listed factors are: 
(1) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (2) the dura-
tion and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with 
which the mark is used; (3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity 
of the mark; (4) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is 
used; (5) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is 
used; (6) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels 
of trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction 
is sought; (7) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third 
parties; and (8) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principle register. 
Id.  Senate Report 515, on the original version of the anti-dilution bill, stated that “[e]ach 
of the factors set forth in the provision should be weighed independently and it is the cu-
mulative effect of these considerations which will determine whether a mark qualifies for 
federal protection from dilution.”  S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 42 (1988). 
104. See, e.g., Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (former 
professional baseball players); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (professional wrestlers); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (actor); Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982) (actress and 
entertainer); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (“hu-
man cannonball”); Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1953) (professional baseball players); see also Darren F. Farrington, Should the First 
Amendment Protect Against Right of Publicity Infringement Actions Where the Media is a 
Merchandiser? Say It Ain’t So, Joe, Note, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
779, 784 (1996) (stating that the right generally benefits entertainers, athletes, and other 
celebrities who have well known images). 
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (“One who appropri-
ates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s 
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability.”). 
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furthered by this right is allowing a celebrity to protect his or her 
livelihood by controlling the use of his or her image.106  The unau-
thorized use must be a commercial one, which includes advertis-
ing, promotions, and implied endorsements.107  Protectable aspects 
of a celebrity’s identity could include his or her name,108 like-
ness,109 portrait,110 signature,111 voice,112 or other characteristics of 
his or her  persona.113  In many states, the right of publicity is 
viewed as a property right that is freely transferable114 and de-
scendable.115 
 
106. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 564, 573 (1977) 
(protecting the image of a “human cannonball” because his image constituted his act 
which was a means of earning a livelihood); see also 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra 
note 30, § 28.1 (“The right of publicity is the inherent right of every human being to con-
trol the commercial use of his or her identity.”). 
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46-49; J. Thomas 
McCarthy, Public Personas and Private Property: The Commercialization of Human 
Identity, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 697 (1989) [hereinafter McCarthy II]; see also Ma-
dow, supra note 19, at 127-29 (discussing the significance of commercial use with 
trademark dilution). 
108. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 845 (6th Cir. 
1983) (holding that the phrase “Here’s Johnny” used for portable toilets violated Johnny 
Carson’s right of publicity). 
109. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261-62 (Sup. 
Ct. 1984) (imposing liability for the use of a look-alike of Jackie Onassis side-by-side 
with real celebrities in a clothing advertisement), aff’d, 488 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1985) (mem.). 
110. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding 
that a caricature of Muhammad Ali fell under the “portrait, photograph” category of the 
New York statute protecting publicity rights). 
111. See United States Life Ins., Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1951) (holding that the unauthorized use of an employee’s signature on advertising 
materials for a medical plan infringed on his property rights). 
112. See Middler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (impos-
ing liability under the common law for unauthorized imitation of Bette Middler’s voice in 
a Ford Motor Company television advertisement). 
113. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that Vanna White had a cause of action under the common law against the use of 
a robot which had a blonde wig, wore a gown, and posed next to the “Wheel of Fortune” 
game board), reh’g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). 
114. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-16 (West 1997) (recognizing the right of 
publicity as freely transferable in whole or in part, by contract, license, gift or trust); TEX. 
PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.004 (West 1997). 
115. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West 1996) (providing a post-mortem right 
of publicity for a term of 50 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1997).  But see 
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 n.2 (N.Y. 1984) (“[W]e 
need not consider whether the statute would also control assignment, transfer or descent 
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1. Development of the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity has its foundation in the right of pri-
vacy.116  The tort law concept of a right of privacy originated in a 
famous law review article written in 1890 by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis.117  They argued that the common law should pro-
tect “the private life, habits, acts and relations” of individuals from 
public exposure.118  Warren and Brandeis emphasized the need to 
protect those who were harmed when private facts about them 
were publicly disclosed.119 
In a 1902 case, Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, Co.,120 the 
New York Court of Appeals refused to adopt a common law right 
of privacy.121  The New York legislature, in response to this deci-
sion, became the first to codify a right to privacy.122  And in Pave-
sich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,123 the Georgia Supreme 
Court recognized that an insurance company’s unauthorized use of 
the plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement, unreasonably in-
fringed on his right to be left alone, the essence of the Warren-
Brandeis privacy notion.124  Though state courts began to accept 
 
of the publicity rights.”). 
116. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (“The princi-
pal historical antecedent of the right of publicity is the right of privacy.”); McCarthy I, 
supra note 28, at 1704. 
117. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
118. See id. at 193. 
119. See id. at 196, 215-16. 
120. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (refusing to grant relief to a plaintiff whose picture 
had been used without consent on flour boxes). 
121. See id. 
122. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1996). Section 50 of New 
York’s privacy statute makes it a misdemeanor for a “person, firm or corporation [to use] 
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any 
living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person.”  Id. § 50.  
Section 51 establishes a civil cause of action, for equitable relief and damages, in favor of 
“[a]ny person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising 
purposes or for the purposes of trade” without the written consent contemplated by sec-
tion 50.  Id. § 51. 
123. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
124. See id. at 78; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 117, at 193, 196, 215-16 
(arguing for the right to privacy).  See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications 
of a Right of Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1993) 
[hereinafter Langvardt II], for a discussion about the origins and rationales for the right of 
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the right of privacy, the evolving privacy law appeared incapable 
of dealing with commercial appropriation beyond the concept of a 
right to be left alone.125 
The term “right of publicity” was first coined in 1953 by Judge 
Jerome Frank in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc.126 to denote a person’s commercial interest in the value 
of his or her identity apart from purely privacy rights.127  The fol-
lowing year, Professor Melville B. Nimmer laid the foundation for 
the right of publicity.128  Professor Nimmer defined it as the right 
to reap the commercial value of one’s identity when it is used for 
advertising or some other commercial purpose.129  Professor Nim-
mer emphasized that what a celebrity wants is not protection 
against unreasonable intrusion into privacy, but a right to control 
the commercial value of his or her identity.130 
Professor William Prosser, in an influential article written in 
1960, categorized four distinct torts as being encompassed by the 
developing right of privacy law including appropriation of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness for commercial benefit.131  This ap-
proach was incorporated into the Restatement (Second) on Torts in 
 
publicity. 
125. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 28:3 (discussing the origins 
of the right to privacy). 
126. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
127. See id. at 867-69.  Thirty years after Haelan Labs., the New York Court of Ap-
peals expressed a contrary view, holding that a common law right of publicity does not 
exist in New York.  See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 
(N.Y. 1984).  Instead, according to the court, the state’s privacy statutes provide the ex-
clusive cause of action with regard to commercial uses of names and likeness.  See id. at 
584 (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51).  Stephano, a decision of New York’s high-
est court, controls Haelan Labs., a decisions of the federal court of appeals, over whether 
New York recognizes a common law right of publicity.  Haelan Labs., however, has had 
an impact on the development and recognition of the right of publicity in states other than 
New York.  See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.7 
(1994) [hereinafter MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY RIGHTS]. 
128. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
203, 215-18 (1954). 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 203-04. 
131. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).  The three 
other categories are (1) intrusion upon one’s physical solitude or seclusion, (2) publicity 
which involves public disclosure of private facts, and (3) publicity which places a person 
in a false light in the public eye.  See id. 
CORDERO.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
622 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:599 
1977.132  That same year, the Supreme Court recognized the right 
of publicity for the first time in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.133  The Court reasoned that the goal of the right 
of publicity was to prevent unjust enrichment and that it was an en-
forceable right separate from claims made for invasion of privacy 
or defamation.134 
2. State Statutory Law and Common Law Rights 
In 1903, New York became the first state to enact statutory 
protection for the right to privacy encompassing the right of pub-
licity.135  The statute prohibited the use of a person’s name, por-
trait, or picture for advertising purposes or purposes of trade with-
out the person’s written consent.136  New York courts have 
consistently stated that the rights of privacy and publicity are rec-
ognized purely as a statutory right.137  Fifteen states protect public-
ity rights statutorily,138 some through privacy statutes139 and others 
 
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (1977).  Under the title “In-
vasion of Privacy,” sections 652A through 652I address the general principles of privacy 
rights, the intrusion upon seclusion, the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, the pub-
licity given to a person’s private life, the publicity placing person in false light, absolute 
privileges, conditional privileges, damages, and the personal character of the right of pri-
vacy.  Id. 
133. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  Zacchini is the sole United States Supreme Court case to 
address the right of publicity. 
134. See id. at 576; see also Langvardt II, supra note 10, at 356-62 (analyzing the 
Zacchini decision). 
135. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1997). 
136. See id. 
137. See, e.g., Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 
1984) (noting that the rights of privacy and publicity are derived from statutory law); 
Finger v. Omni Publication Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990) (same); Shamsky v. 
Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (same). 
138. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, §§ 28:17-28:39 (compiling 
state statutory law); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 
32-13-1-1 to 32-13-1-20 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597.770-597.810 (Mi-
chie 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28.1 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-
25-1108 (1997); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-26.015 (West 1997); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to 45-3-6 (1993); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).  See Donna 
L. Candido, The Right of Publicity: An Overview, 476 PLI/PAT. 181, 201-04 (1997), for 
an overview of the right of publicity. 
139. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20-
211, 25-840.01 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1 (Michie 1997). 
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through legislation specifically aimed at protecting publicity 
rights.140 
The right of publicity has been recognized as existing under the 
common law of sixteen states.141  Of those sixteen states, six also 
have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass the right of 
publicity.142  Those sixteen states include those whose own courts 
have recognized the right,143 and those in which federal courts, that 
are applying state law, have held that a state right exists.144  The 
scope of protection under the common law has often been much 
broader to protect aspects of a person’s persona not specifically 
covered by state statutory law.145 
 
140. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 
(Banks-Baldwin 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1448-1449 (West 1997). 
141. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (rec-
ognizing California common law right); Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 
867 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding Connecticut common law); Genesis Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Goss, 437 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Florida common law); 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. v. American Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) 
(Georgia common law); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 
(Haw. 1968) (Hawaii common law privacy right); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 
769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois common law); Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, 
Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (Kentucky common law); Carson v. Here’s 
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (Michigan common law); Uh-
laender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (Minnesota common law); 
Haith v. Model Cities Health Corp., 704 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (Missouri 
common law); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (New 
Jersey common law); Reeves v. United Artists Corp., 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985) (Ohio 
common law); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Pennsylvania com-
mon law); Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (Texas 
common law privacy right); Nature’s Way Prods., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. 
Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990) (Utah common law); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, 280 
N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (Wisconsin common law right). 
142. See supra notes 138, 141 (noting that the “common law” and “statutory” states 
are California, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin). 
143. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. v. American Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697 
(Ga. 1982). 
144. See Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 897 F. Supp. 175, 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“I hold that Connecticut’s high court would recognize the right of pub-
licity.”). 
145. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g 
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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3. Protection of Publicity Rights Under Section 43(a) 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been used to protect pub-
licity rights against commercial use of a person’s persona that con-
stitutes false endorsement.146  Celebrities, such as Woody Allen, 
have used section 43(a) to prevent the unauthorized use of their 
images or likenesses in advertising that constituted false endorse-
ment, where state statutory or common law rights of publicity were 
not available.147  Section 43(a), on the other hand, does not prevent 
advertisement that contains unauthorized use of a person’s image 
or likeness absent false endorsement or generally a likelihood of 
confusion.148  Falsity or a likelihood of confusion are not necessary 
elements to prove infringement of the right of publicity.149 
D. The First Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Defense 
The freedom of speech, as embodied in the First Amendment, 
provides a limitation for imposing liability for trademark infringe-
ment, anti-dilution, and appropriation of publicity rights.150  The 
First Amendment confers a measure of protection for the unauthor-
ized use of trademarks where the use is an expression of a commu-
nicative message.151  Generally, defendants have successfully in-
voked First Amendment protection of unauthorized trademark use 
in parodies or other forms of artistic expression in the absence of 
consumer confusion.152  As well, the right of publicity also must 
 
146. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a). 
147. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(stating that the case would be better addressed under section 43(a) false endorsement 
rather than the New York statute). 
148. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a); see also 4 MCCARTHY supra note 30, § 28:14 (discuss-
ing section 43(a)). 
149. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(“[T]he appearance of an endorsement is not the sine qua non of a claim of commercial 
appropriation [of the right of publicity].”). 
150. See discussion supra note 37 and accompanying text (citing decisions protect-
ing First Amendment interests in trademark, dilution, and publicity rights cases). 
151. See Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Corp., 809 F. Sup. 267, 276 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
152. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g. Group, Inc., 886 
F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that “Spy Notes” was a permissible, parody of 
“Cliffs Notes”). 
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bow to the First Amendment where a person’s name, image, or 
persona is used in a communicative capacity, such as a news report 
or documentary film.153 
The level of protection afforded by the First Amendment in 
trademark and publicity rights cases ultimately depends upon the 
type of speech involved.154  Historically, expressions about politi-
cal, philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, scientific, or 
ethical matters were entitled to full First Amendment protection.155  
On the other hand, speech that proposes a commercial transaction, 
principally advertising, was not recognized as being afforded First 
Amendment protection until the Supreme Court’s decision in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.156  In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held that com-
mercial speech may be “more durable” than other types of speech 
and, as a result, “there is little likelihood of its being chilled by 
proper regulation.”157  Therefore, commercial speech receives an 
intermediate level of First Amendment protection only if it pertains 
to a lawful activity and is not misleading.158 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission,159 the Supreme Court embellished the rationale of 
Virginia Pharmacy by observing that two features of commercial 
speech permit regulation of its content.160  First, commercial 
speakers are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their mes-
sages; and second, commercial speech is not “particularly suscep-
 
153. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
the use of a celebrity’s name in a movie title was permissible). 
154. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, §§ 28:41, 31:141 (analyzing 
the commercial/artistic speech distinction); Langvardt I, supra note 10, at 643 (discussing 
the different levels of protection afforded speech). 
155. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (finding 
that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters 
may be entitled to full First Amendment protection). 
156. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
157. Id. at 772 n.24. 
158. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1989); Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-63, 770-72 
(1976). 
159. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
160. Id. at 564 n.6. 
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tible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”161  Yet, where tra-
ditional advertising as commercial speech is “inextricably inter-
twined” with communicative speech, the totality is treated as non-
commercial, fully protected speech.162  Arguably, all advertising 
contains socially valuable information, and communicative speech 
has a commercial component, therefore, courts have problems dis-
tinguishing between the two.163 
Ultimately, the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech may wither away.164  In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island,165 four justices in a plurality, represented in two 
opinions, openly advocated for full First Amendment protection 
for commercial speech that is not deceptive.166  Justice Stevens, 
who announced the judgment of the Court, spoke for three Justices 
when he noted that “[a]dvertising has been a part of our culture 
throughout our history.  Even in colonial days, the public relied on 
‘commercial speech’ for vital information about the mar-
ket . . . .”167 
Courts have provided defendants in trademark infringement 
cases and anti-dilution claims, greater liberty in using another’s 
mark in the context of parody or other forms of artistic expres-
 
161. Id. 
162. Riley v. National Fed’n of Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988); see also 4 
MCCARTHY supra note 30, § 31:141 (analyzing the commercial/artistic speech distinc-
tion). 
163. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that the use of the musical group’s identity in a revenue gener-
ating phone number survey was not commercial).  But see Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983) (stating that an informational pamphlet discussing the 
social issues of human sexuality and venereal disease was commercial speech). 
164. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515-
20 (1996). 
165. 517 U.S 484, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
166. See id.  Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and stated that 
the Court would provide full constitutional protection to commercial speech.  Id. at 1507.  
Justice Thomas, concurring separately, noted that truthful commercial speech could not 
be regulated more than non-commercial speech.  Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
167. Id. at 1504.  According to Justice Stevens: “Indeed, commercial messages 
played such a central role in public life prior to the Founding that Benjamin Franklin au-
thored his early defense of a free press in support of his decision to print, of all things, an 
advertisement for voyages to Barbados.”  Id. 
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sion.168  In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,169 the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that trademark rights 
against infringement and dilution do not entitle the owner to extin-
guish the unauthorized use of a mark by another in an editorial 
parody.170  In Girl Scouts of America v. Bantam Doubleday Bell 
Publishing Group, Inc.,171 the Southern District of New York held 
that the plaintiff’s protected trademark and any evidence of a like-
lihood of confusion were “sufficient to overcome the First 
Amendment value of protecting creative works,” such as the de-
fendant’s children’s book.172 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.,173 that the First Amendment did not in-
sulate the television news media from liability in broadcasting the 
entire act of a “human cannonball,” courts have extended freedom 
of speech protection to defendants in publicity rights cases.174  In 
Rogers v. Grimaldi,175 Ginger Rogers sued the producers of a fea-
ture film entitled “Ginger and Fred” for violating her right of pub-
licity.176  The film was a satire built around the bittersweet reunion 
of two retired dancers who were once known by the nicknames 
“Ginger and Fred” because they imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred 
Astaire—America’s dancing legends and symbols of “style, ele-
 
168. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981) (finding that a parody-advertisement showing “Poppin Fresh” and “Poppie 
Fresh” engaged in sexual intercourse was not trademark infringement); Girl Scouts of 
Am. v. Personality Posters Mfg., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (finding that a 
poster depicting pregnant woman in a Junior Girl Scout uniform would not confuse the 
public as to its source); see also Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 846 (discussing the parody 
defense to trademark infringement). 
169. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987). 
170. Id. at 29, 31. 
171. 808 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
172. Id. at 1130. 
173. 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
174. See, e.g., Benavidez v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 
1989) (holding that defendant beer company, which underwrote a documentary film con-
taining an 80 second segment of the plaintiff war hero, was protected under the First 
Amendment); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (C.D. 
Cal. 1990) (allowing the use of the plaintiff’s likeness in a non-commercial setting). 
175. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
176. Id. at 997. 
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gance, and grace.”177  The court held that Ginger Rogers’ right of 
publicity must “bow to the superior interest in allowing her name 
to be used as a symbol to communicate ideas.”178  The court fur-
ther held that there is no violation of the right of publicity where 
the name or image of a celebrity is used for its symbolic signifi-
cance.179 
II. ICONS OF POPULAR CULTURE 
All cultures invent icons, with early symbols appearing in an-
cient tombs demonstrating the isolation in time and space of 
painted animals.180  Eventually, such symbolic imagery becomes 
“conventionalized, systematized and commercialized.”181  For ex-
ample, ancient Pompeiians made their domestic house shrines 
gathering places for traditional memory, tutelary powers, and gods, 
using distinct colors, details, and craftsmanship to attain a vital and 
expanding group of icons.182  The pop icons of today are constantly 
being evoked and evolved, redesigned and reshaped as our infor-
mation-age society seeks to revitalize our images.183  The symbols 
of our time, specifically, Coca-Cola, Elvis, and Barbie, are an inte-
gral part of the common culture, whose images have been pro-
tected in an attempt to diffuse their links to the masses.184 
A. Coca-Cola 
John “Doc” Pemberton, a Confederate veteran who was ob-
sessed with inventing the ultimate medicine to break his morphine 
addiction, created a sugary syrup containing sugar, water, coca 
 
177. Id. at 996. 
178. Id. at 1004-05. 
179. Id. 
180. See FISHWICK, supra note 16, at 131 (discussing the ancient use of cultural 
icons). 
181. HERBERT READ, ICON AND IDEA 17 (1955). 
182. See FISHWICK, supra note 16, at 133 (citing GEORGE K. BOYCE, CORPUS OF THE 
LARARIA OF POMPEII (1968); DAVID PYE, THE NATURE AND ART OF WORKMANSHIP 
(1968)). 
183. See id. (analyzing how icons are developed in modern society). 
184. See Madow, supra note 19, at 142 (discussing cultural images importance in 
popular culture). 
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leaves, and kola nuts in the spring of 1886.185  Coca-Cola was born 
in the era of patent medicine, where promoters were the first to 
recognize the power of the catch phrase, identifiable logos, and ce-
lebrity endorsements.186 
The soft drink’s trademark was originally registered in 1887 
and, a year later, Georgia businessman Asa Chandler (“Chandler”) 
gained all rights to the formula.187  Chandler soon formed the 
Coca-Cola Company (“Company”) and battled charges that the 
beverage led to cocaine addiction.188  Under Chandler and his suc-
cessors, the aid of an annual advertising budget of one million dol-
lars, a Supreme Court decision, and essentially being the only 
drink in town during Prohibition, Coca-Cola permeated every as-
pect of American society.189  The Company’s advertising was spe-
cifically geared to represent the product in pleasant, poignant 
scenes of every day American life and successfully engendered it-
self into the national culture, eventually defining America.190 
Coca-Cola’s success bred competition and imitators, as hun-
dreds of counterfeiters flooded the market with sound-alike soft 
drinks at the turn of the century.191  Yet, the product’s greatest 
 
185. See PENDERGRAST, supra note 12, at 19-27 (examining the origins of Coca-
Cola). 
186. See id. at 12-13. 
187. See id. at 55-62.  The word “Coca-Cola” was subsequently re-registered in 
1893, 1905, and 1928.  See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 
1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
188. See PENDERGRAST, supra note 12, at 55-62. 
189. See id. at 91, 176-177. 
190. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 8-9 (discussing the affect of Coca-Cola’s adver-
tising on American culture).  Colonel Robert L. Scott, Jr. wrote: 
I don’t know exactly what democracy is, or the real, common-sense meaning of 
a republic.  But as we used to talk things over in China, we all used to agree 
that we were fighting for the American Girl.  She to us was America, democ-
racy, Coca-Colas, hamburgers, clean places to sleep, or the American Way of 
Life. 
ROBERT L. SCOTT, JR., GOD IS MY CO-PILOT 166 (1943); see also ALLEN, supra note 15, 
at 122. 
191. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 73.  Among the imitators were: “Afri-Cola, 
Ameri-Cola, Ala-Cola, Bolama-Cola, Café-de-Ola, Carbo-Cola, Candy-Kola, Capa-Cola, 
Chero-Cola, Christo-Cola, Coke-Ola, Coo-EE-Cola, Curo-Cola, Grap-O-Cola, Its-A-
Cola, Kaffir-Kola, Kaw-Kola, Kiss-Kola, Ko-Ca-Ama, Koca-Nola, Ko-Co-Lem-A, 
Kokola, Klu Ko Kola, Loco Cola, Luna Cola, Mitch-O-Cola, Mo-Cola, My Cola, Roco-
Cola, Toca-Cola, Taka-Cola, Qua-Kola, Uneeda-Cola, Zeto-Cola, and Zippi-Cola.”  Id. 
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threat came from Dr. Harvey Washington Wiley, chief chemist of 
the United States Department of Agriculture.192  Dr. Wiley 
launched a crusade to ban the soft drink because he believed that it 
contained cocaine and other harmful ingredients.193  Having failed 
in his attempt to find cocaine in Coca-Cola, Dr. Wiley brought suit 
against the Company.194  He claimed that the product was mis-
branded and adulterated by the addition of caffeine, in violation of 
section 10 of the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906.195  In 
United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola,196 
the district court judge issued a directed verdict for the Coca-Cola 
Company, holding that the name of the soft drink was not mis-
branded because it did not contain coca, and was not adulterated by 
the content of caffeine.197  The Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion and the case was eventually settled, but what resulted was the 
question whether Coca-Cola was a valid trademark.198 
In 1920, the Coca-Cola Company brought suit against J. C. 
Mayfield, the former partner of Doc Pemberton, and his Koke 
 
192. See id. at 48. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. 21 U.S.C. § 10, repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 
ch. 675, §§ 1, 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059.  According to section 10, drugs are deemed 
misbranded: 
[W]hen there is an imitation or use of name of other article, when there is re-
moval and substitution of contents of package or failure to state on label quan-
tity or proportion of narcotics therein, and when there is a false statement of 
curative or therapeutic effect; and food, when there is an imitation or use of 
name of other article, when there is a false label or brand removal and substitu-
tion of contents of package, or failure to state or label quantity or proportion of 
narcotics therein, when the packages are not marked with weight, with certain 
variations and exemptions permitted, when there are false or misleading state-
ments on package or label as to ingredients or substances; and food, when mix-
tures or compounds under distinctive names, the articles are labeled, branded as 
compounds, imitations or blends; construed the term “blend” and related to dis-
closure of trade formulas of proprietary foods, and canned food. 
Id.; see also ALLEN, supra note 15, at 58 (stating that Dr. Wiley had the “unshaken be-
lief” that caffeine was injurious to human health and that he desired to punish the Coca-
Cola Company). 
196. 191 F. 431 (E.D. Tenn. 1911), rev’d, 241 U.S. 265 (1916). 
197. See id. at 436-38. 
198. See United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 241 U.S. 
265, 290 (1916). 
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Company of America, an obvious imitator, for trademark in-
fringement.199  A decree for the Company was reversed by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling that, in spite of Mayfield’s 
blatant infringement, the Coca-Cola Company lost its trademark 
protection because it had made fraudulent representations as to the 
product’s content.200  The Supreme Court reversed the circuit 
court’s ruling, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.201  
Justice Holmes dispelled the notion that the soft-drink was fraudu-
lently represented, and stated that “[w]hatever may have been its 
original weakness, the [Coca-Cola] mark for years has acquired a 
secondary significance and has indicated the [Company’s] product 
alone.”202  Justice Holmes further stated that Mayfield’s use of the 
word “Koke” was chosen for the purposes of reaping the benefit of 
the product’s goodwill and that it would be unsound to deny 
trademark protection against a “palpable fraud.”203  The decision 
saved Coca-Cola, frightened off most copycat manufactures, and 
was a sword in the Company’s ongoing crusade to defend its 
trademark against flagrant infringers such as Co-Cola and Coke-
Ola as well as claims of genericism.204 
Coca Cola’s crusade has reached beyond the realm of cola 
competitors, bringing suits for trademark infringement against such 
individuals as the owners of a Los Angeles restaurant named “Co-
cola,” an Italian term of endearment.205  The Company not only 
 
199. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 121 (discussing the trademark infringement suit 
by the Coca-Cola Company). 
200. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 145 (1920), superseded 
by statute as stated in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. 514 U.S. 159 (1995); 
see also ALLEN, supra note 15, at 121 (commenting that Coca-Cola Company brought 
actions against Mayfield in Washington, D.C. and four other states for the sake of thor-
oughness and harassment). 
201. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 121. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 145-47. 
204. See id. at 210 (“Harold Hirsch had assembled a team of lawyers. . .who 
scoured the land protecting Coca-Cola’s trademark, hunting down violators, and filing 
hundreds of lawsuits that produced a blizzard of orders, injunctions, decrees, and judg-
ments against defendant’s big and small.”).  Six decades after Coca-Cola v. Koke, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the word “Coke” was presumptively not generic 
to all cola beverages.  See Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1253-55 ( 9th 
Cir. 1982). 
205. See PENDERGRAST, supra note 12, at 415.  The puzzled owners quickly com-
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wanted to prevent the use of the Coca-Cola mark or variations, but 
also desired to control its portrayal in advertising of non-
competitors.  In Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising Inc.,206 the Company 
was granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the printing, distri-
bution, and sale of the poster, “Enjoy Cocaine” in characteristic 
Coca-Cola stylized script, color, and design despite the defendant’s 
contention that the poster was a satire.207  The district court agreed 
with the Company that “[to] associate such a noxious substance as 
cocaine with plaintiff’s wholesome beverage as symbolized by its 
‘Coca-Cola’ trademark and format would clearly have a tendency 
to impugn that product and injure plaintiff’s business reputa-
tion.”208  The district court, in an attempt to protect the image of a 
national symbol, utilized New York’s dilution doctrine confusingly 
intertwined with the Lanham Act, in order to punish the defen-
dant’s bad taste, despite First Amendment implications.209 
Two decades after Gemini Rising, the Coca-Cola Company 
once again attempted to protect its soft drink’s image.210  This time 
dealing with comparative advertising, the Company sought a tem-
porary restraining order against a carbonated soda manufacturer for 
the portrayal of Coca-Cola as un-pure in a television commer-
cial.211  Polar Corporation’s commercial featured a computer gen-
erated polar bear, similar to the one used in Coca-Cola’s “Always 
Coca-Cola” campaign,212 that examines a Coke can, makes an un-
 
plied, changing the restaurant’s name to “Boyd Street Grill,” even though the restaurant 
only sold R.C. Cola.  Id. 
206. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
207. Id. at 1187, 1192-93. 
208. Id. at 1189. 
209. See id. at 1188.  Coca-Cola asserted the right to protect its mark by injunction 
on the grounds that defendant’s poster (1) unfairly disparaged Coca-Cola’s product, (2) 
created a likelihood of confusion under the section 43 of the Lanham Act, (3) created a 
likelihood of injury to reputation under New York law, and (4) libeled Coca Cola.  Id. at 
1190.  The district court stated that Coca-Cola had sufficiently demonstrated right to in-
junctive relief under both federal and state law, holding that there was a likelihood of 
confusion and injury to reputation.  Id. at 1191. 
210. See Polar Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 871 F. Supp. 1520 (D. Mass. 1994). 
211. See id. 
212. As part of Coca-Cola’s battle with its competitors, Coca-Cola’s advertising 
campaign utilized state of the art computer technology and the slogan “Always, Coca-
Cola,” with a group of polar bears watching the Northern Lights together while sipping 
Cokes.  ALLEN, supra note 15, at 424 (analyzing the “Always Coca-Cola” campaign). 
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happy sound, and then flips the can over its shoulder into a trash 
bin below a sign that reads “Keep the Arctic Pure.”213  The polar 
bear then reaches down into the freezing, Arctic water and pulls 
out a can of Polar Seltzer and drinks contentedly.214  The district 
court granted the Company’s motion because the commercial “im-
plied that Coke [was] not pure,” misrepresented the nature and 
quality of Coke, thereby potentially harming the soft drink irrepa-
rably.215  The district court went beyond the notions of tarnish-
ment, utilizing the false advertising component of the Lanham Act 
in order to protect Coca-Cola’s image, not only from being associ-
ated with an illicit substance as in Gemini Rising, but also from the 
mere implication of impurity.216 
B. Elvis Presley 
During his career, Elvis Aaron Presley (“Elvis”) established 
himself as one of the premier musical talents and entertainers in 
the United States, Europe, and other areas of the world.217  He was 
the major force behind the American rock-and-roll movement, and 
his influence and popularity continues to this day.218  On August 
16, 1977, Elvis died, but his legend and worldwide popularity have 
flourished as well as his capacity for generating financial re-
wards.219  After death, Elvis has elevated from idol to icon, being 
the center of a cultural obsession that ranges from impersonators 
and sightings, to candlelight vigils at his “shrine” in Graceland.220 
The Estate of Elvis Presley (“Estate”), its licensees, and Elvis 
Presley Enterprises—the assignee and registrant of all trademarks, 
 
213. Polar Corp., 871 F. Supp. at 1521. 
214. See id. 
215. Id. at 1521-22. 
216. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998); supra note 77 and ac-
companying text; see also infra Part I.B.2 (discussing trademark dilution under state and 
federal law). 
217. See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1345-47 (D.N.J. 
1981). 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. Lou Carlozo, Elvis, An Enduring Icon Twenty Years After His Death, He’s Still 
Bigger Than Life, and the Myths Often Overshadow His Real Cultural Impact, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Aug.10, 1997, at F1; see also MARCUS, supra note 13, at 202 (discussing Elvis 
Presley’s growth in popularity after his death). 
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copyrights, and publicity rights belonging to the Estate—have at-
tempted to safe guard the image of Elvis as well as maximize their 
financial gain.221  Soon after Elvis’s death, the proprietors of his 
image brought suit against Pro Arts Incorporated (“Pro Arts”), the 
manufacturer of a poster that contained a copyrighted photograph 
owned by the defendants, carrying the words “In Memory . . . 
1935-1977.”222  Factors Etc., Inc., and Boxcar Enterprises, Inc., 
were granted a permanent injunction enjoining the manufactures 
from marketing Elvis memorabilia.223  The district court rejected 
the argument that the publication of the poster was protected by the 
First Amendment because it commemorated a newsworthy 
event.224  Pro Arts was ultimately victorious, not because the Sec-
ond Circuit agreed with its First Amendment assertions, but be-
cause of a technicality; Tennessee, whose law governs the suit, did 
not recognize a descendable right of publicity.225 
In Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,226 the Estate found some 
success in asserting its exclusive right to commercially exploit the 
image of Elvis, when they sought an injunction against the produc-
ers of a stage show in which a performer imitated Elvis and sold 
memorabilia based on the performance.227  The show, entitled 
“The Big El Show,” was promoted with slogans such as: “Reflec-
tions on a Legend . . . A Tribute to Elvis Presley” and “Looks and 
Sounds Like the King.”228  The district court in deciding whether 
to issue a preliminary injunction, determined that the show served 
primarily commercial goals and was afforded lesser protection un-
 
221. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977); Estate of Elvis Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1345-47; Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. 
Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
222. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1978).  
Boxcar Enterprise was a corporation owned by Elvis Presley and his manager, “Colonel” 
Tom Parker, which, after Elvis’s death, granted Factors Etc., Inc. the exclusive right to 
exploit the name and likeness of Elvis.  See id. 
223. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), rev’d, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981). 
224. See id. 
225. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981). 
226. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
227. Id. at 1349. 
228. Id. at 1349. 
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der the First Amendment.229  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that the Estate’s ability to profit from exploiting Elvis’s image was 
only diminished by the sale of memorabilia, not from the “Big El 
Show” production itself.230  The defendants were enjoined from 
selling record albums, pendants, and other memorabilia based on 
the show that contained artistic representations of the Elvis imper-
sonator because of a likelihood of confusion, but still were allowed 
to continue with the show.231 
The Estate, in the guise of Elvis Presley Enterprises, achieved a 
hollow victory in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece.232  
Barry Capece opened a nightclub in Houston, Texas named under 
his registered trademark, “The Velvet Elvis.”233  The name, “The 
Velvet Elvis” referred to one of his more coveted velvet paint-
ings.234  Pictures and references to Elvis were also used in the 
nightclub’s decorations, the menus, and advertisements promoting 
the establishment.235  Elvis Presley Enterprises sued Capece for un-
fair competition, trademark infringement, dilution, as well as 
common law and statutory right of publicity, seeking injunctive re-
lief and cancellation of “The Velvet Elvis” trademark.236  The dis-
trict court only enjoined the defendant from advertising the night-
 
229. See id. at 1359. 
230. Id. at 1380. 
231. See id. at 1389. 
232. 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
233. Id. at 787.  Registration for the service mark, which was uncontested during 
the requisite 30-day period, “The Velvet Elvis,” was issued to Capece for use in the res-
taurant and tavern business.  Id. at 788. 
234. Id. 
235. See id. at 789.  A number of advertisements contained actual pictures of Elvis, 
while others made direct reference to the deceased singer or Graceland using phrases 
such as “The King Lives,” “Viva la Elvis,” or “Elvis has not left the building.”  Id.  The 
bar’s menu bears a caption, “The King of Dive Bars,” containing drinks such as “Love 
Me Blenders,” delicacies named “Your Football Hound Dog” and peanut butter banana 
sandwiches. Id. 
236. Id. at 789.  The plaintiff claimed that the inclusion of its “Elvis” trademark in 
the service mark “The Velvet Elvis” coupled with the defendant’s use of the image and 
likeness of Elvis in promoting the bar created confusion as to whether the plaintiff, Elvis 
Presley Enterprises, licensed, approved, or sponsored the bar.  Id.  Also, according to the 
plaintiff, the use of the Elvis name in association with a “tacky bar that indiscriminately 
displays explicit and almost pornographic paintings of nude women has tainted the 
wholesome image of Elvis.”  Id. at 798; see also supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2 (analyzing 
trademark infringement and trademark dilution). 
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club using Elvis’s image, which was no longer used, but otherwise 
denied relief.237  The court reasoned that the night club’s name and 
decor were protected under the First Amendment as a parody in-
tending to mock an era of lava lamps, velvet paintings, and bell 
bottoms, “remembered for its sensationalism and transient desire 
for flashiness” in which Elvis was a part of.238 
C. Barbie Doll 
Barbie was created in 1957 by Ruth Handler, the later-expelled 
co-founder of Mattel Inc. (“Mattel”).239  It was inspired by a Ger-
man doll named Lilli, a pornographic caricature that was a lascivi-
ous plaything for men.240  The doll is sold in more than 140 coun-
tries at the rate of two dolls every second, netting Mattel $2 billion 
in annual profits.241  Artists and writers have exploited the “volup-
tuous clotheshorse” as muse and metaphor, developing a rich body 
of images and texts that use the doll to comment on class inequal-
ity, racial stereotypes, and the dark evanescence of childhood 
sexuality.242  Since the height of the feminist movement, activist 
such as Gloria Steinem have criticized the figure as perpetuating 
“sexual stereotypes by encouraging little girls to see themselves 
solely as mannequins, sex objects or housekeepers.”243  Barbie is a 
 
237. See id. at 802-03.  The advertising “lacked a recognizable connection to the 
Defendant’s parodic purpose,” and overemphasized the word “Elvis” than “Velvet.”  Id. 
at 796.  By the time of trial, however, Capece no longer used that advertising.  See id. 
238. See id. at 792, 802. 
239. Mrs. Handler was forced out of Mattel in 1975, and three years later was in-
dicted with four other employees by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiring to vio-
late federal securities, mail, and banking laws by preparing false financial statements.  
See Amy M. Spindler, Bless Her Pointy Little Feet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, § 7, at 22.  
She pleaded no contest and was required to perform 2,500 hours of community service 
and pay $57,000 in fines.  See id. 
240. See LORD, supra note 14, at 26-29 (discussing the origins of Barbie). 
241. See Spindler, supra note 239, § 7 at 22; see also Kevin M. Williams, Mattel 
Sues Band Over ‘Barbie Girl’, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at 24 (reporting on Mat-
tel’s suit against MCA records for copyright and trademark infringement). 
242. M.G. Lord, The Question Is: What Would Ken Think?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
1995, at C1. 
243. Feminists, Schoolchildren and Antiwar Demonstrators Picket Annual Whole-
sale Toy Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 29, 1972, at 20; see also LORD, supra note 14, at 89-90 
(stating that the National Origin for Women began its formal assault on Mattel in August 
1971). 
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pop icon that is vilified, lauded, deconstructed, avidly collected, 
and jealously protected by Mattel.244 
Mattel’s first attempt to protect Barbie, two years after the doll 
was first registered and marketed, proved unsuccessful in Mattel, 
Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Manufacturing Co.245  Mattel brought an 
action for trademark infringement and unfair competition against 
Goldberger Doll Manufacturing Co. (“Goldberger”).246  Goldber-
ger was the producers of “Miss Babette,” a blonde doll the same 
height as Barbie, accompanied by similar attire and accessories.247  
Despite acknowledging Mattel’s efforts to promote its commodity, 
the considerable public acceptance associated with the product and 
the fact that vendors who sold “Miss Babette” advertised it as 
“Barbie-Type,” the district court held that the defendant did not in-
fringe Mattel’s trademark.248  The court reasoned that the name 
“Miss Babette” was not confusingly similar to “Barbie” as to “de-
ceive an ordinary prudent purchaser” and that the defendant had 
“no control over its [vendors] or the manner in which they adver-
tise its products.”249  In recent years, with Barbie’s ascendancy to 
cultural icon, Mattel has had more success in defending its product, 
even to the extent of receiving the aid of United States Customs to 
prevent the importation of dolls that only possibly infringed Mat-
tel’s intellectual property rights.250 
Today, Mattel has attempted to prevent the use of Barbie’s im-
age and name by any unauthorized user including magazine pub-
lishers and advertisers.251  For the last five years, Dan Miller has 
 
244. See Phillips, supra note 15, at A12 (analyzing the cultural impact of Barbie). 
245. 200 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). 
246. Id. at 517. 
247. Id.  The original name of Goldberger’s doll was “Babette,” but they added 
“Miss” at the time of the lawsuit.  Id. at 518. 
248. Id. at 518-19. 
249. Id. 
250. See Miss America Org. v. Mattel, Inc., 945 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1991).  The Miss 
America Organization, who contracted with Kenner Products to design Miss America 
commemorative dolls, was unable to prevent United States Customs officers from detain-
ing shipments of the dolls from China on “suspicion of infringement.”  Id. at 538. 
251. Magazines are afforded the same First Amendment protection as Newspapers.  
See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Rangland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987).  But maga-
zines may be entitled to less protection than advertising, if categorized as commercial 
speech.  See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 427 (1993). 
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published Miller’s, a quarterly magazine for Barbie lovers that re-
views the quality and price of Barbie dolls.252  The publication has 
been available at FAO Schwartz as well as the corporate store at 
Mattel’s headquarters.253  In April, 1997, after the magazine pub-
lished photos of Barbie in tennis garb with a pack of Virginia 
Slims cigarettes, alcohol, and pills in its 1996 winter edition, Mat-
tel brought suit for trademark and copyright infringement.254  In 
the fall of the same year, Mattel filed suit against Japanese car-
maker Nissan for trademark and copyright infringement.255  The 
suit involves an innovative and critically acclaimed Nissan televi-
sion ad.256  The commercial features an animated commando doll 
named Nick who rescues the red-head Roxanne from the boredom 
of her doll-house, whisking her off in a red Nissan toy sports car 
under the Van Halen recording of the Kinks song “You Really Got 
Me.”257 
Mattel’s protective reach has also extended to non-commercial 
entities such as artist Paul Hansen and the band, Aqua.258  During 
Christmas 1996, the works of Paul Hansen were available in se-
lected San Francisco shops on Castro Street and displayed in art 
galleries.259  Those works included modified Barbie dolls named 
“Hooker Barbie,” replete with a negligee, a condom, and a fifty 
dollar bill.260  Other of Hansen’s works include “Carrie Barbie,” 
wearing a prom dress drenched in blood and “Big Dyke Barbie,” 
featuring a pierced nose and quote bubble that asks, “Want to 
 
252. See Denise Gellene, Mattel’s Battle Over Barbie Isn’t Child’s Play Litigation: 
Toy Maker’s Suit Accuses Magazine of Using Doll’s Name and Image Without Permis-
sion, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at D2 [hereinafter Gellene I]. 
253. See id. 
254. See id.; Denise Gellene, Fits of Pink; Barbie Collectors Go Toe-to Toe with 
Mattel, WASH. POST, May 16, 1997, at B02 [hereinafter Gellene II]. 
255. See Advertising: Mattel Sues Nissan Over TV Ad, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, 
at D2.  Mattel asserts that the television commercial caused “irreparable injury to [its] 
name, business reputation and goodwill.”  Id. 
256. See id. 
257. Id. 
258. See Kelly Flaherty, Sue Me, Barbie, RECORDER, Nov. 11, 1997, at 1 (detailing 
Mattel’s efforts to protect the image of Barbie). 
259. See Vicki Haddock, Christmas Shoppers Seeking This Seasons ‘Hot’ Barbie 
Items Have Alternatives to Real Thing, J. REC., Dec. 19, 1996 [hereinafter Haddock II] 
(discussing Anti-Barbie). 
260. Flaherty, supra note 258, at 1. 
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Shoot Some Pool?”261  Mattel has taken issue with Hansen’s nega-
tive portrayal of Barbie and filed suit, in August 1997, for trade-
mark and copyright infringement, seeking to enjoin Hansen from 
displaying or selling his art in galleries.262 
Finally, Mattel has brought suit against MCA Records, the dis-
tributor of the Danish-band Aqua’s song, “Barbie Girl,” for copy-
right and trademark infringement.263  The song, containing lyrics 
such as, “you can brush my hair, undress me everywhere . . . kiss 
me here, touch me there, hanky panky,” was released as part of 
Aqua’s album “Aquarium,” in Denmark and throughout Europe in 
March 1997.264  The song was released in the United States in Au-
gust of the same year, and peaked at number seven on the Bill-
board’s pop singles chart.265  Aqua, who was not named in the law-
suit, has declared that “the song isn’t about the doll, it’s about the 
plastic world we live.”266  Both the single and album have a dis-
claimer stating that the song is a “social comment that has not been 
created or approved by the makers of the doll.”267  Mattel is seek-
ing to enjoin the further sales of the album and single, the further 
broadcast of the music video, close down Aqua’s web site on the 
Internet, and compel the removal of all copies of the single and al-
bum from record store shelves.268 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION SHOULD BE AFFORDED TO 
INDIVIDUALS WHO USE THE IMAGE OR REPRESENTATION OF 
CULTURAL ICONS 
One of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is to fa-
cilitate enlightenment and truth for the benefit of the public 
through the free exchange of ideas.269  To serve this purpose, 
 
261. Haddock II, supra note 259. 
262. See Flaherty, supra note 258, at 1. 
263. Don’t Toy With Our Doll, Mattel Warns Infringers, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 1997, at 
A31. 
264. Lisa Bannon, This Suit for Barbie is More Flattering than Song’s Lyrics, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1997, at B8 (discussing Aqua’s song, Barbie Girl). 
265. See id. 
266. Williams, supra note 241, at 24. 
267. Bannon, supra note 264, at B8. 
268. See id. 
269. See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is 
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where the intangible property such as a trademark or publicity 
rights are used for its symbolic significance, a balance must be 
struck in favor of freedom of expression over ownership rights.270  
Rights holders such as the Coca-Cola Company, Elvis Presley En-
terprises, and Mattel have attempted to use trademark law, anti-
dilution, and publicity rights to extract a monopoly that prevents 
others from using names or images that are significant in American 
culture.271  This Part maintains that a new standard, more expan-
sive than the fair use or parody defense, should apply to cases in-
volving the use of cultural icons, in order to advance First 
Amendment principles.  In addition, this Part suggests that an 
analysis distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial 
speech is untenable when dealing with cultural icons. 
A. The Use of Cultural Icons Should be Protected in the 
Absence of Likelihood of Consumer Confusion 
When dealing with the image or representation of cultural 
icons, such as Coca-Cola, Elvis, or Barbie, the unauthorized use 
should be permitted so long as it does not cause a likelihood of 
confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation.272  Although this 
proposed standard complies with traditional trademark principles, 
it may undermine publicity rights and anti-dilution doctrines in fa-
vor of the realization that cultural symbols progress to the level of 
ideas and discourse.273  The district court in Elvis Presley Enter-
 
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail.”); Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the truth of any idea can only be determined 
in the marketplace of competing ideas). 
270. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989). 
271. See supra Part II (discussing Coca-Cola, Elvis, and Barbie). 
272. The notion of consumer confusion remains the foundation of the legal protec-
tion of trademarks and is incorporated in the Lanham Act.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) 
(West 1998 & Supp. 1998); Shaughnessy, supra note 41, at 181, 183-84 (examining the 
likelihood of confusion standard in trademark infringement).  The standard here proposed 
would require rights holders to show a likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of 
evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence as some commentators have argued.  See, 
e.g., Langvardt I, supra note 10, at 653 (advocating for a clear and convincing standard 
where the alleged infringement is in the form of a non-commercial expression). 
273. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We 
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Right of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 142 (1996) (“[A rights holder’s] contribution may not be suffi-
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prises v. Capece,274 recognized this transformation from image to 
icon, stating that “the image of Elvis, conjured up by way of velvet 
paintings, has transcended into iconoclastic form of art that has a 
specific meaning in our culture, which surpasses the identity of the 
man represented in the painting.”275 
Coca-Cola Company, Mattel, and to a lesser extent, Elvis 
Presley Enterprises have spent millions of dollars promoting their 
products, images, or personae; but ultimately it is the consumer 
who makes these images profitable and socially valuable.276  In 
light of these economic realities, it is questionable whether to give 
rights holders monopolies over the commercial exploitation of 
their names, images, or personae to the exclusion of the general 
public.277  A limited monopoly, governed under traditional trade-
mark law rather than the more expansive anti-dilution doctrine and 
publicity rights, is more appropriate.278 
The standard proposes that the members of the public, such as 
artists like Paul Hansen, or even “advertisers” like Nissan, be al-
 
cient to create the vibrancy of an image and project it into public consciousness.”); see 
also Jollymore, supra note 9, at 130 (arguing that a celebrity loses the right to control his 
or her image when the image achieves symbolic significance). 
274. 950 F. Supp. 783, (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
275. Id. at 792. 
276. See Jollymore, supra note 9, at 126. 
277. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th. Cir. 1980).  
The Sixth Circuit, in dealing with celebrity rights, offered that: 
Fame often is fortuitous and fleeting.  It always depends on the participation of 
the public in the creation of an image.  It usually depends on the communica-
tion of information about the famous person by the media.  The intangible and 
shifting nature of fame and celebrity status, the presence of widespread public 
and press participation in its creation, the unusual psychic rewards and income 
that often flow from it during life and the fact that it may be created by bad as 
well as good conduct combine to create serious reservations about making fame 
the permanent right of a few individuals to the exclusion of the general public. 
Id. at 959; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir.), 
reh’g denied, 971 F2d 1395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting); Bi-Rite Enter., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-96 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
278. Although a likelihood of confusion, as the touchstone of trademark infringe-
ment, protects the public, the anti-dilution doctrine protects the trademark holder in the 
absence of confusion, and the right of publicity protects a celebrity’s persona from com-
mercial misappropriation.  See Prager, supra note 93, at 122 (analyzing trademark dilu-
tion); Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 850-51 (discussing the right of publicity). 
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lowed to use the images of cultural icons, such as Barbie, in any 
form of expression, so long as there is no implication that the 
rights holder, such as Mattel, owned or sponsored the expres-
sion.279  This allows the public to share in an image it helped create 
and to comment on the image’s meaning regardless of the me-
dium.280  The balance permits rights holders to profit from their 
marks or images without depriving the public, in the form of artists 
and advertisers, from engaging in cultural expression.281 
1. Legally Defining “Cultural Icon” 
Though scholars have defined the phrase “cultural icon” in 
ethereal terms,282 a precise legal definition is necessary in order to 
facilitate a clear and reliable standard.  A status-based standard dis-
tinguishing marks and celebrities from cultural icons is analogous 
to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding defamation.283  
The Court has imposed a high tier “actual malice” standard on 
public figures, rather than private individuals, when balancing First 
Amendment principles and the individual’s interest in freedom 
from harm to his or her reputation.284  The rationale for this status-
based standard is that an analysis concentrating solely on the sub-
 
279. See supra Part II.C (detailing Mattel’s efforts to protect the image of Barbie). 
280. See Dreyfuss, supra note 273, at 124 (addressing who should reap the benefits 
of images, “those who introduce them into popular culture or those who imbue them with 
enduring meaning”). 
281. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intel-
lectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (1991) (ar-
guing that in the current climate, “intellectual property laws stifle dialogic practices—
preventing us from using the most powerful, prevalent, and accessible cultural forms to 
express identity, community, and difference”). 
282. See FISHWICK, supra note 16, at 131 (defining the word “icon”). 
283. See Mark D. Walton, The Public Figure Doctrine: A Reexamination of Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. in Light of Lower Federal Court Public Figure Formulations, 16 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 151 (1995) (examining the distinction between public and private 
figure defamation and the constitutional defamation standard). 
284. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).  The plaintiff in Gertz 
was an attorney who represented the family of a youth who was shot and killed by a Chi-
cago police officer.  Id. at 325.  The officer was subsequently convicted of second degree 
murder, and the plaintiff represented the victim’s family in a civil suit against the officer.  
See id.  The defendant published an article falsely accusing the plaintiff of being a Com-
munist, Marxist, and Leninist.  See id. at 326.  The article also falsely accused the plain-
tiff of having a lengthy police record and falsely asserted that the plaintiff was responsi-
ble for framing the police officer.  See id. 
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ject matter of the defamatory statement provides inadequate pro-
tection of First Amendment interests.285 
The means of defining a public figure is helpful in determining 
what is a “cultural icon.”  Circuit courts have defined a general-
purpose public figure as a well-known celebrity whose name is a 
“household word.”286  Considering that cultural icons are both per-
sons and objects that are household words, a more definitive de-
lineation appears appropriate.  The Dilution Act287 only entitles 
protection to marks that are “famous,” providing a non-exclusive 
list of eight factors that courts may consider in determining 
whether a mark is famous.288  This is a significant departure from 
state statutes, which typically have required only “distinctive-
ness.”289  Distinctiveness is the level of uniqueness required for 
protection against trademark infringement.290  This higher level of 
requisite uniqueness is in tune with the Congressional intention of 
qualifying the dilution remedy as an “extraordinary” one that re-
quires a significant showing of fame.291 
Commentators have stated that the fame intended under the Di-
lution Act is a synonym for “super-distinctiveness.”292  Using this 
 
285. See id. at 345-46. 
286. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publication, Inc., 627 F. 2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).  The court listed several factors that could be consid-
ered in this determination, including statistical surveys regarding name recognition, pre-
vious media coverage of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s influence on the actions of others, 
and whether the plaintiff has successfully shunned media attention.  See id. at 1295.  The 
court noted that the most important aspects of this determination are the “voluntariness” 
of the plaintiff’s notoriety and the plaintiff’s access to the media.  Id. 
287. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (detailing the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act). 
288. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H); see also supra note 103 (listing the factors). 
289. Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F. 3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“In order to prevail on a claim of dilution under [the New York State dilution statute], 
the plaintiff must prove. . .that its trade dress or trademark either is of truly distinctive 
quality or has acquired secondary meaning . . . .”); see also Prager, supra note 93, at 127 
(detailing the eligibility standard for protection under the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act). 
290. See Prager, supra note 93, at 127. 
291. Report of the Trademark Review Commission, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 461 
(1987) (“We believe that a higher standard [than fame among an “appreciable number” of 
persons] should be employed to gauge the fame of a trademark eligible for this extraordi-
nary remedy.”). 
292. Prager, supra note 93, at 130 (“It may be that fame is intended to be a syno-
CORDERO.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
644 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:599 
concept, a cultural icon can be categorized as “ultra-distinctive.”  
In making this determination, courts should use the eight statutory 
factors associated with “famous” under the Dilution Act, plus an 
additional element.293  This additional element can be defined as 
whether the mark or person has achieved “tertiary meaning.”  Ter-
tiary meaning is achieved when a mark or person has acquired 
symbolic significance, a meaning beyond that of its descriptive 
sense and secondary meaning.294  Accordingly, both persons such 
as Elvis and objects such as Barbie, may achieve iconic status and 
thus would be covered under the proposed standard. 
2. A Likelihood of Confusion Standard Serves the 
Interests of Rights Holders and the Public 
A likelihood of confusion standard embraces the social signifi-
cance associated with Coca-Cola, Elvis, and Barbie, balances soci-
ety’s and rights holders’ interests, thus eliciting a just result where 
the use of cultural icons is challenged in non-competitive situa-
tions.295  Consumer confusion remains the foundation of legal pro-
 
nym for ‘super-distinctiveness,’ and this would be consistent with the caselaw under the 
state statutes and with Congress’ eight factors.”). 
293. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (listing the factors). 
294. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13. cmt. e.  The Re-
statement defines “secondary meaning” as: 
[Referring] to a subsequent significance added to the original meaning of the 
term.  Secondary meaning exists only if a significant number of prospective 
purchasers understand the term, when used in connection with a particular kind 
of good, service, or business, not merely in its lexicographic sense, but also as 
an indication of association with a particular, even if anonymous, entity. 
Id. 
295. The Polaroid multifaceted analysis to determine likelihood of confusion is 
primarily used in non-competitive situations, however, the Second Circuit has been ex-
panded it to reach competing goods.  See Physicians Formula Cosmetics, Inc. v. West 
Cabot Cosmetics, Inc., 857 F. 2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Although the Polaroid test 
originally was applied to non-competing products, it has been expanded to apply where, 
as here, competing goods are involved.”).  But generally, a likelihood of confusion will 
easily be found where the goods are competing and the marks are similar.  See Lindy Pen 
Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 796 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1986).  Considering that in situations 
involving competitive goods, the injury results from a direct diversion of sales, a balance 
should be struck in favor of the rights holder.  See 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra 
note 30, § 24:22.  Yet to be competitive, there is a question of “interchangeability” of 
products, where by a purchaser is willing or ready to substitute one product for another.  
Id. supra § 24:23.  Where an advertiser or artist uses the image of a cultural icon, the 
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tection of trademarks and is the touchstone of trademark infringe-
ment.296  On the other hand, the dilution doctrine is concerned with 
granting protection to trademarks beyond that provided by the 
“likelihood of confusion” test.297  With publicity rights, consumer 
confusion is of no concern, the focus being on the “identifiability” 
of the plaintiff as a person.298  Although consumer confusion pro-
tects the public, anti-dilution protects rights holders from the di-
minishment of their marks, and publicity rights protect a person 
from the commercial appropriation of his or her image.299 
The prohibition against unauthorized uses of trademarks that 
are likely to cause consumer confusion serves three related societal 
interests.300  First, it shields the public from misleading informa-
tion in the market place.301  Second, it prevents the unjust enrich-
ment of the infringer, who would otherwise be able to gain by 
adopting the trademark owner’s identity and reputation as his 
own.302  Finally, it insulates the trademark owner from the possibil-
ity that the infringer will pass off inferior products as those of the 
rights holder, harming the rights holder’s reputation among the 
 
question of “interchangeability” is mute because the purchaser desires to buy the artist or 
advertiser’s expression, not his or her product over the rights holder’s product.  Id. 
296. See id. § 23:1 (discussing the likelihood of confusion standard); Shaughnessy, 
supra note 41, at 181 (examining the preeminence of the likelihood of confusion stan-
dard). 
297. See 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 24:70. 
298. Id. § 28:12; see also University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food 
Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“There may be no likelihood of such 
confusion as to the source of goods even under a theory of ‘sponsorship’ or ‘endorse-
ment,’ and, nevertheless, one’s right of privacy, or the related right of publicity, may be 
violated.”).  “Identifiability” measures whether an insignificant number of people can 
identify the object person from the defendant’s unauthorized commercial use.  3 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 28:12. 
299. See id. §§ 24:70, 28:12 (analyzing trademark dilution and the right of public-
ity). 
300. See Shaughnessy, supra note 41, at 181 (discussing the societal interests pro-
tected by the likelihood of confusion standard). 
301. See Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 348 
(5th Cir. 1984) (“By ensuring correct information in the marketplace, the [trademark] 
laws reduce losses caused by misunderstanding and deceit and thus permit consumers and 
merchants to maximize their own welfare confident that the information presented is 
truthful.”). 
302. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Finance, Inc., 123 F.2d 582, 
584 (5th Cir, 1941). 
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consuming public.303  The first interest is unique to the likelihood 
of confusion doctrine, the second is akin to the rationale supporting 
anti-dilution, and the third is similar to the protection against the 
loss of commercial value of one’s persona under the right of pub-
licity.304 
Where cultural icons are concerned, these societal interests are 
served by affording the individual the opportunity to use his or her 
image free from liability, so long as the work does not deceive the 
public.305  In the absence of deceit, there is a significant distinction 
between the rights holder’s mark or image and the defendant’s use 
that does not result in unjust enrichment, because something of 
value is added to the cultural image.306  A rights holder may claim 
that the use injures his or her reputation or diminishes the commer-
cial value of his or her mark or image, but any negative association 
made to the cultural icon is a result of free expression in the realm 
of First Amendment protection.307 
The proposed standard, as applied to the three icons that are the 
subject of this Note, would lead to an equitable result.  In Coca-
Cola v. Gemini Rising,308 the use of the words “Enjoy Cocaine” 
would not be enjoined because there is no likelihood of confusion 
contrary to the district court’s analysis, and that allusion to Coca-
Cola was in the spirit of ridiculing a national symbol.309  Applying 
 
303. See Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).  If the 
unauthorized user of the trademark is a direct competitor of the trademark owner, the 
owner faces the possibility of diversion of trade as well as harm to reputation.  In this 
situation, the infringement creates the likelihood that some consumers will buy the in-
fringer’s product believing it to be that of the trademark owner.  Here, there is both unjust 
enrichment of the infringer and unjust impoverishment of the trademark owner.  See 1 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 2:10. 
304. See id. §§ 23:1, 24:70, 28:7. 
305. Deceit, which was the common law foundation for trademark law, occurs when 
the public is confused.  See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (detailing the views and works 
of authors who are proponents of “cultural populism.”). 
307. See supra Part I.D (analyzing First Amendment protection of expression). 
308. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
309. See id. at 1191; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 
(9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that “much of the vibrancy of our cul-
ture . . . depends on the existence of . . . intangible rights,” such as the “right to draw 
ideas from a rich and varied public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as well as 
fun, the cultural icons of our time”), reh’g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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the proposed standard to Polar Corp. v. Coca-Cola,310 would lead 
to a different result in granting Polar Corporation a declaratory 
judgment entitling them to broadcast the television commercial.311  
Here, unlike other cases, Coca-Cola employed the Lanham Act’s 
prohibition against false representations in advertising to prevent 
the use of its image by a competitor.312  Polar Corporation, as a 
competitor, may present a direct threat to Coca-Cola because Polar 
Corporation may divert revenue away from the rights holder 
through the use of a similar mark.313  There was, however, no rea-
sonable expectation of confusion from the use of Coca-Cola’s im-
age in Polar Corporation’s commercial.314  The throwing of a 
Coca-Cola can into the trash in an animated commercial, would 
only give a subtle implication of impurity, which alone, should not 
have been enough to inhibit Polar Corporation’s expression.315 
With Barbie, there is no likelihood of confusion as to the art-
work of Paul Hansen’s “Big Dyke Barbie” and the like, as well as 
Nissan’s commercial because Mattel does not possess the rights to 
every female doll in the market, but with Miller’s Publication, the 
result may be different.316  Though Mr. Hansen’s work may be dis-
tasteful, his work acts as a commentary on the image of Barbie in 
our society, and the creative endeavors of Nissan’s advertisers are 
 
310. 871 F. Supp. 1520 (D. Mass. 1994). 
311. Polar Corporation’s use of the Coca-Cola trademark may be covered under fair 
use for comparative advertising.  The Federal Trade Commission encourages the naming 
of competitors in comparative advertising.  See FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 
C.F.R. § 14.15(b)-(c) (1988) (“Commission policy in the area of comparative advertising 
encourages the naming of, or references to competitors . . . .”).  In general, it is neither 
trademark infringement nor unfair competition to truthfully compare products in advertis-
ing, and in doing so, to identify by trademark, the competitor’s goods.  See 3 MCCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 25:52. 
312. Polar Corp., 871 F. Supp. at 1521; see also supra note 77 and accompanying 
text (quoting section 43(a) as enacted). 
313. See 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 24:1 (discussing the effects 
of a competitor’s use of another’s mark). 
314. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, (9th Cir. 1979) (“When the 
goods produced by the alleged infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark 
owner, infringement usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confu-
sion can be expected.”). 
315. See 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 23:9 (analyzing what consti-
tutes consumer confusion). 
316. See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text (discussing Miller’s Publica-
tion’s use of the Barbie trademark). 
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protected because the television commercial only “calls to mind” 
which traditionally is not enough to establish trademark infringe-
ment.317  With Miller’s Publication, there may be a likelihood of 
confusion, but the use of Barbie’s image would be protected under 
other defenses to trademark infringement and dilution.318 
3. The Fair Use Doctrine and Parody Defense Does Not 
Adequately Serve First Amendment Principles and the 
Public’s Interest 
The fair use doctrine and a parody defense may not be suffi-
cient in safeguarding First Amendment principles in light of the di-
lution doctrine and the right of publicity.319  The fair use doctrine 
balances society’s interest in using words or images in their pri-
mary descriptive sense with a trademark owner’s right to exclusiv-
ity.320  This fair use defense “allows a competitor to use another’s 
registered trademark to describe aspects of one’s own goods.”321  
 
317. 3 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 23:9 (“‘Confusion’ means more 
than that the junior user’s mark merely ‘calls to mind’ the senior user’s mark.”). 
318. Miller’s Publication, which began publishing Miller’s in 1992 and circulated 
the magazine at Mattel headquarters, may successfully evoke the affirmative defenses of 
laches and acquiescence.  See Gellene I, supra note 252, at D2; Cuban Cigar Brands, 
N.V. v. Upmann Int’l, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1090, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (laches defense), 
aff’d, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jenna, 293 F. 
Supp. 892, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (acquiescence defense) , aff’d, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
319. See Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 971 
F.2d 1395, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). 
320. The fair use defense is available when the allegedly infringed trademark has 
both a “primary” meaning, that is, an ordinary descriptive usage, and a “secondary” 
meaning, which identifies the product of a specific business.  Shaughnessy, supra note 
41, at 200 n.125; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).  The 
Lanham Act states that: 
[T]he use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, 
otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own business, or 
of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or de-
vice which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe 
the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4); see also Car-Freshener Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 
F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995); 2 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 11:45-11:49 
(“No one competitor can use trademark law to exclude others from use of a word in its 
primary, descriptive and non-trademark sense.”). 
321. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
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The difficulty with the fair use defense as dealing with cultural 
icons is that it has little relevance where the dilution doctrine is 
evoked because it is simply a recognition of a specific application 
of the Lanham Act’s test of infringement—-there is no likelihood 
of confusion where a term is used in its descriptive sense.322  Un-
der federal law, the dilution doctrine protects “famous” marks from 
diminishing its uniqueness or portraying it in an “unwholesome or 
unsavory context,” without an inquiry as to confusion.323  The dilu-
tion theory allows courts to prohibit the unauthorized use of cul-
tural icons that are famous by their very nature, where there is no 
reasonable possibility of confusion and a minimal amount of tar-
nishment exists, if at all.324 
Parody, which is an ancient form of social commentary and lit-
erary criticism, has been viewed as a form of artistic expression 
that is protected by the First Amendment.325  Courts have often 
stated the general proposition that parodies and satires deserve 
substantial freedom as entertainment and as a form of social and 
literary criticism.326  Although the dilution doctrine has been 
viewed as violating the First Amendment where a trademark owner 
attempted to inhibit trademark parodists,327 courts have shown a 
propensity to find trademark infringement where the parody is dis-
tasteful.328  For example, in Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,329 
 
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). 
322. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4); see also Shaughnessy, supra note 41, at 200 
(discussing the likelihood of confusion standard). 
323. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (c)(1); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d. 39, 43 
(2d Cir. 1994); see also supra Part I.A.2 (analyzing trademark dilution). 
324. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).  
The Gemini Rising decision occurred before the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act, but the court recognized that Coca-Cola “was so widely known” that there was 
little doubt that the mark was “famous.”  Id. at 1187; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (c)(1). 
325. See Cliffs Notes v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 
(2d Cir. 1989); Groucho Marx Prod. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (2d Cir. 
1982) (recognizing “the broad scope permitted parody in First Amendment law”). 
326. See Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist’s Claim to Fame: A Parody Excep-
tion to the Right of Publicity, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97, 114 (1993) (advocating for a parody 
exception to the right of publicity). 
327. See L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding 
that anti-dilution statutes can violate the First Amendment rights of trademark parodists 
whose pornographic magazine’s parodied L.L. Bean’s trademark). 
328. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (detailing decisions finding trade-
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the district court’s ruling that the “Enjoy Cocaine” poster impaired 
Coca-Cola’s mark is essentially that the mere suggestion of the 
name in connection with an illegal substance tarnishes the mark.330  
In right of publicity cases, courts have refused to recognize a par-
ody exception to the right of publicity where the use is for com-
mercial purposes.331 
An appropriate outcome, akin to the proposed standard, re-
sulted in Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Capece,332 where the district 
court acknowledged Elvis’s cultural significance and refused to 
find trademark infringement, misappropriation of publicity rights, 
or dilution even though the Elvis name and image were associated 
with a “tasteless” bar that displayed explicit pictures of woman.333  
The Capece court only enjoined the defendant’s use of Elvis’s im-
age in advertising because there was a likelihood of consumer con-
fusion.334 
B. The Distinction Between Commercial Speech and 
Noncommercial Speech Is Untenable When Dealing With 
Cultural Icons 
Both artists and advertisers have used the image or representa-
tions of cultural icons to comment on society, criticize the symbol, 
or sell merchandise.335  In our pop culture, “where salesmanship 
must be entertaining and entertainment must sell,” the line between 
commercial and non-commercial speech has disappeared.336  Af-
 
mark infringement when marks are used in connection with pornographic or offensive 
material). 
329. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
330. Id. at 1190. 
331. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992). 
332. 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
333. Id. at 798. 
334. Id. at 792. 
335. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (detailing the significance of cultural 
icons in contemporary society). 
336. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F. 2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).  Judge Kozinski questioned: 
Is the Samsung parody [of Vanna White in a television commercial] any differ-
ent from a parody on Saturday Night Live or in Spy Magazine? . . .  Both use a 
celebrity’s identity to sell things—-one to sell VCRs, the other to sell advertis-
ing.  Both mock their subjects.  Both try to make people laugh.  Both add some-
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fording different First Amendment protection on the basis of 
whether the use of a cultural icon is commercial speech or non-
commercial speech fails to acknowledge its social significance and 
the role the public plays in its creation.337  Elvis symbolizes 
“American Rock-n-Roll,” Barbie symbolizes “a beautiful but 
empty headed accessory” and American sexism, and to nations of 
the world, Coca-Cola symbolizes America itself.338 
The level of First Amendment protection should not be deter-
mined upon whether Paul Hansen created “Trailer Trash Barbie” 
solely for a museum exhibit, rather than for sale.339  If Aqua’s song 
“Barbie Girl” is protected as artistic speech, it should not matter 
that the single sold hundreds of thousands of copies.340  Nissan’s 
television commercial is highly acclaimed for creativity, and ar-
guably more brilliant than traditional artistic work, and the unau-
thorized use of Barbie’s image should not be penalized solely be-
cause the advertisement proposes a commercial transaction.341 
Commentators have proposed that the medium for where the 
trademark is used, and not the message, should be dispositive in 
determining whether there is infringement.342  This complies with 
traditional Supreme Court analysis, affording commercial speech a 
lower level of First Amendment protection.343  Therefore, even 
though Aqua’s song is a social commentary and Paul Hansen’s 
 
thing, perhaps something worthwhile and memorable, perhaps not, to our cul-
ture. 
Id. 
337. See Madow, supra note 19, at 139 (analyzing society’s role in the creation of 
cultural symbols). 
338. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (detailing the symbolic signifi-
cance of Elvis and Barbie). 
339. See supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text (discussing Mattel’s suit 
against artist Paul Hansen). 
340. See Bannon, supra note 264, at B8. 
341. See The Best Awards:  Automotive Toyland Adventure Boosts Enjoyable Nis-
san:  Ride Honda Seeks Sanity, While Fantasies Sell Jeeps, Electric Cars, ADVERTISING 
AGE, May 26, 1997, at S2 (detailing the success of the Nissan commercial). 
342. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 31:152 (“In situations where 
the First Amendment is invoked in cases of the allegedly communicative use of a trade-
mark . . . it is the medium, not the message, that will often make the difference in re-
sult.”). 
343. See supra notes 154-167 and accompanying text (detailing the level of protec-
tion afforded commercial speech). 
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work merely mocks society, there is infringement if the use is 
commercial.344  In order to prove a prima facie case for dilution 
under the Dilution Act, a plaintiff must prove that the “defendant is 
making commercial use” of his or her mark.345  The right of pub-
licity affords protection against the “commercial” use of a celeb-
rity’s name, image, or persona, and some courts have reasoned that 
parodies and satires are not protected if the use is commercial in 
nature.346 
Commercial speech is a significant, valuable part of our na-
tional discourse.347  Commentators have challenged the Supreme 
Court’s rationale for distinguishing commercial and non-
commercial speech on various grounds.348  For example, Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc.,349 has 
been criticized as operating under a false presumption that personal 
or economic incentive prevents commercial expression from being 
“chilled” by regulation.350  Political speech, which is afforded full 
constitutional protection, arguably is motivated by considerations 
of personal benefit.351  Ironically, the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in protecting free expression from being “chilled” by a 
defamation action, involved a paid-for advertisement that appeared 
in the New York Times.352 
One of the underlying rationales for affording commercial 
speech a lesser degree of First Amendment protection was to pro-
 
344. See supra notes 154-167 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship 
between commercial speech and infringement). 
345. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). 
346. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publ’g, 811 F.2d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(limiting First Amendment protection to non-commercial parodies). 
347. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F. 2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir.) (Koz-
inski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). 
348. See Redish, supra note 41, at 565-74.  Professor Redish suggests that a com-
mercial speech distinction is flawed because (1) the distinction is impermissible as con-
tent-based, (2) commercial speech and non-commercial speech are equally verifiable, (3) 
a speech-action dichotomy does not apply, (4) self-interest is immaterial, and (5) a corpo-
rate entity-person distinction is irrational.  Id. 
349. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
350. Redish, supra note 41, 565-66 (questioning the Supreme Court’s distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial speech). 
351. See id. 
352. Id.; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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tect consumers from undesirable persuasion to purchase prod-
ucts.353  This reasoning, when applied to situations involving cul-
tural icons, is unsound considering the profound nature of a widely 
known image.  If the commercial speech distinction no longer ex-
ists, the proper analysis will be of the message, not the medium.354  
Justice Stevens in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,355 reasoned 
that deceptive commercial speech should be afforded minimal con-
stitutional protection but concluded that restrictions on “truthful, 
nonmisleading messages” demand “rigorous” First Amendment 
review.356  Using the image of cultural icons in posters, artwork, or 
television commercials should be protected regardless of the me-
dium, as long as the use is a “truthful, nonmisleading message” as 
alluded to in 44 Liquormart, that is, no confusion as to source, 
sponsorship, or affiliation.357 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property rights are essential to modern life.  They 
provide incentive for investment and innovation and allow culture 
to flourish.  The rights are imposed, however, at the expense of fu-
ture creators and the general public.  Yet, as the court noted in 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the vibrancy of cul-
ture depends upon the existence of a right to draw ideas from the 
public domain, and the right to mock cultural icons for both com-
mercial and entertainment purposes.  Although individuals create 
trademarks or personae, society elevates them to symbols, celebri-
ties, and ultimately icons.  To deny the public the use of icons, 
such as Coca-Cola, Elvis, and Barbie, would be to ignore the pub-
lic’s role in the creation of these images. 
Recognition of the partnership that exists between the public 
and rights holders would allow for equal use, so long as there is no 
likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation.  
Such qualified recognition would prevent public deception while 
 
353. See Redish, supra note 41, at 555. 
354. See 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 30, § 31:152 (arguing for a “me-
dium” rather than a “message” approach). 
355. 517 U.S 484, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
356. Id. at 1506-07. 
357. Id. at 1507. 
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protecting the interest of rights holders in controlling their owner-
ship images.  Overprotection of images deters creativity and ulti-
mately hurts society.  Coca-Cola Company, Elvis Presley Enter-
prises, and Mattel, Inc. earn enormous amounts of money through 
the exploitation of the images they own.  Allowing the use of these 
images—-for societal commentary, for product critiques, or for 
simple fun—would not injure the earning power of the cultural 
icons and will benefit everyone.  The reverse would injure us all. 
